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BY MR. STEWART:

- Good morning, Dr. Crandall. O
- 3 A Good morning, Mr. Stewart, nice to see 4 you.
 - Q There you go. We had a disagreement about that just yesterday with respect to a cross examiner. (Laughter.)
 - I will be polite even if we disagree.
- 9 Q Would you turn to the first page of your 10 testimony.
 - The rebuttal testimony? Α
- 12 Correct, yes. And this first section here begins with paragraphs 4 and 5 on this page? 13
- 14 Yes. A

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- Q You essentially say that the Bortz Study is a -- provides a proper measure the Panel to use in allocating the royalties in this case. Is that right?
- 18 Α Yes.
- 19 Q And that is without reservation, I take 20 it, with respect to any of the numbers that were 21 produced by the Bortz Study, any of the results?
- 22 Well, that's an answer which reflects my

that no, it should not, is that right?

Well, I don't think in toto, no, it should not. I'm saying that the Bortz Survey may not take the seller's perspective and indeed in past proceedings involving these copyright allocations there's been questions about taking the seller's perspective.

of the categories and particularly for the Joint Sports Claimants, there's no reason to be concerned about that. There may be -- you may want to adjust in some ways and I think one example would be the commercial broadcasters and here's where we may disagree.

- 15 0
 - A Yes.
- 17 I'm going to continue on with things we 18 agree on for a while anyway.
 - A Okay.
 - Q market have some monopoly -- I'm sorry, some market power. Is that right?

Page 10098

understanding of how the survey was conducted, the

- 2 survey design and so forth. I am not privy to any
- 3 particular problems that may have arisen in this room
- 4 or elsewhere with specific numbers that resulted from
- the Bortz Study, so I'm not -- I don't have the 5
- detailed knowledge of that that other people may have б

7 such as Mr. Trautman.

- Q So as you sit here, you have no reason not to recommend that the Panel follow the Bortz survey results with respect to all of the categories measured by the Bortz Survey?
- A I have no reason to believe that the Bortz Survey should not be followed, that's correct.
- Q And I agree with you on that, Dr.
- 15 Crandall. This is really going quite well so far.
 - Α Okay.
- 17 On the next page of your testimony, you 18 talk about, you address the question of whether the 19 Bortz Survey results should be adjusted to reflect the
- 20 seller side considerations. Do you see that?
- 21 A Yes.
- 22 Q And would you explain -- your answer is

A Traditionally, the buyers being the cable systems have been found to have market power in the multi-channel video programming market, yes.

from the fact that typically or historically, let's start with that, they have been the only providers of multi-channel video programming in local markets, is that right?

there's only one. There are over builders and increasing number of over builders today, but still, it is still, I think, widely considered that the cable systems still have some market power.

- Q And that was the case in 1998 and 1999, correct?
- 16 Α Yes.
- 17 Do you have a sense of what percentage of 18 cable markets had cable overbuild competition?
- In 1998 and 1999? 19 Α
- 20 Q Yes.
- 21 Α I have not looked at that. There's always 22 been some, but then with the 1996 Telecommunications

Page 10101 Page 10103 1 Act, some new local telecommunications companies came 1 market power and buyers who have market power. The 2 2 sellers being monopolists, the buyers being in and built Fiberco- networks, RCN, in particular, so 3 there's been an increase in it. But I have no idea 3 monopsonists. 4 what the extent was in 1998 and 1999 or how far it's 4 Q All right, and again --5 5 gone today. JUDGE VON KANN: What does that last term 6 6 Q Can we assume for purposes of this mean? 7 7 discussion that, in fact, in 1998 and 1999 cable THE WITNESS: A single buyer, rather than 8 8 operators, due to the fact that in most markets they a single seller. 9 still were the only provider of multi-channel video 9 JUDGE VON KANN: All right. 10 10 programming, did that have type of market power? BY MR. STEWART: 11 11 Well, they weren't the only supplier Q And you present them because of your 12 multi-channel video programming. They obviously were 12 premise that in 1998 and 1999, if one were seeking to 13 13 replicate a market place in the sale of distant signal a direct broadcast satellite providers, so there were 14 only the sole supplier in areas that couldn't, didn't 14 programs one would have to account for monopsony power 15 15 have a direct view of satellites. on the buyer side? 16 Well, there's a great deal of discussion 16 Turn to Appendix 1, please. 17 17 JUDGE VON KANN: Dr. Crandall, what does of what the marketplace would look like in this 18 proceeding, understandably. And to the extent, the 18 the phrase "over builders" mean? 19 THE WITNESS: It's a term that grew up in 19 point of my testimony in this appendix, the extent 20 the cable business to, I guess, probably among cable 20 that the buyers had market power, the sellers would 21 companies themselves, it's a pejorative. For those 21 probably organize to the extent they were permitted to 22 22 companies that would come in and build cable systems do so under the antitrust laws to provide the Page 10102 Page 10104 1 1 over the plant, right past the plant of another countervailing power and the economists would expect 2 existing cable system. So they were called over 2 people to attempt to, people on the other side of the 3 3 builders rather than those people who are building in market to attempt to organize in a way to offset the 4 discrete ne areas where there was no cable service. 4 market power of the people they face. 5 JUDGE VON KANN: Okay. 5 Looking at the chart on page 15, figure 2. 6 JUDGE YOUNG: They would have to get a 6 First of all, it looks to me like there's a 7 7 franchise from a locality, right? misprinting there, the shaded area appears in my copy 8 8 THE WITNESS: Yes, but I think, my memory anyway as a rectangle. 9 is a little hazy on this, but under the 1984 Act, I 9 A It's a rectangle and actually a trapezoid, 10 think the ability of the municipality to deny them 10 right, shaded area, right. 11 that was greatly reduced. 11 Well, you intended to shade only the area 12 In years past, the municipalities could 12 between, bounded by B, C, C prime, B prime, right? 13 13 restrict entry, but I think with the 1984 Act, their Α Right. 14 ability to do so was essentially eliminated. 14 Q My copy has got the corners shaded as 15 BY MR. STEWART: 15 well. 16 Q Are you at Appendix 1 of your testimony? 16 Bounded -- I'm not sure what you're 17 Yes, I am. 17 talking -- the whole area, B prime, C prime, C, B, it A 18 Would you describe just briefly what this 18 was not rectangular.

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somehow --

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several pages discusses?

Well, this is a discussion of the

bilateral monopoly where there are sellers who have

indeterminacy, if you will, of the situation of

Right. Fair enough if the trapezoid is

MR. GARRETT: Mr. Winters' copy is not

all that we're talking about, then it's mind that's

shaded at all. We have graduate students put thesethings together.

(Laughter.)

JUDGE VON KANN: On the West Coast?

MR. GARRETT: I apologize because it obviously should all be uniform. I have no idea why it's not and we will endeavor to get copies to everyone to ensure that they're all uniform and I hope this cuts down on Mr. Stewart's three hours of cross examination.

MR. STEWART: Not a chance, sorry. It makes me wonder what other differences there might be. This may be a PDF version that in fact it's been printed out.

By MR. STEWART:

Q In any event, you intended to shade that trapezoid?

A Yes.

Q And that represents the area within which, somewhere within which in the situation that you pose the price and quantity would be settled upon, correct?

A Yes, where either the buyer offers a price

the total cost would be, that would be the optimal solution.

Q Well, under your supposition we wouldn't get to that quantity off to the right. The negotiation would slide the price and quantity somewhere within the trapezoid?

A This is not so much my supposition. This is the standard economic theory of bilateral monopoly where someone calls out a price. One side calls out a price and the other one responds to it, it's going to be in that range, but if they could get together and say look, let's figure out what maximizes our joint profits, they would do something different.

Q And in this example, where is the Bortz Survey result?

A Well, the Bortz Survey result is somewhere in there. You don't know at this point exactly what the final institutions would be, but what we're saying is that the Bortz Survey would be somewhere -- I'm saying the Bortz Survey would be somewhere in that area there.

MR. GARRETT: I'm sorry, just so the

Page 10106

or the seller would attempt to offer a price, independently.

Q And the intersection of the two lines off to the right there with the letters Pa to the right of it?

A Yes.

Q That intersection is the -- would be an equilibrium price, is that right, and quantity?

A Well, that intersection between the MC curve and MRP curve is what you're referring to, right?

Q Right.

A That would be for quantity, that is the quantity that would drop down from that level, would be the optimal outcome for both sides because -- look at that line C and C prime. As you move to the right from that there is additional gains to the seller which exceeds, I mean to the buyer, which exceeds the cost to the seller.

So if they could agree to an all or nothing deal, saying we'll agree to the quantity which comes down from that level and then argue about what Page 10108

record is clear, when you say "in that area", which area?

THE WITNESS: The area in the trapezoid or even out to -- it is even indeed possible, if you were to have collectives negotiating that it would all the way out to that intersection that you've dubbed P(a) there to the left of P(a).

BY MR. STEWART:

Q Now on the seller's side, with respect to the Sports Claimants, there is some degree of collective bargaining strength that is provided by the Sports Broadcasting Act's exemption from antitrust laws of certain of the sports leagues. Is that right?

A Well, I guess arguably they can at least organize collectively. Whether this gives them any power over price is another issue that I haven't looked at.

Q I thought we discussed that in your prior visit here.

A I don't recall what I said, but it is possible that that could give them some power.

Q If other program category claimant groups

Page 10111

were able to sell collectively to the same extent then that would equalize whatever influence that had on market power, is that right?

A We know if whether or not it would equalize it. If, in fact, a large group of Program Suppliers were to bargain collectively, be allowed to bargain collectively and the cable systems have no alternatives, those people may be in a superior position actually, the cable companies. After all, the collective programs, the collective of Program Suppliers have alternatives. That is, they have their broadcast satellite companies that can negotiate.

Q And I wasn't clear in my question. I was not talking about equalizing the negotiation between the sellers and the buyers, but equalizing the effect of market power across various groups of sellers?

A Well, even that you can't be sure because it may well be that, in fact, there is not that much competition between say baseball and football, so that the combination of the two in the Joint Sports Claimants represented by counsel here may not add anything to their bargaining power, whereas combining

stations?

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A Yes, but WGN is a super station and TBS of course, as you know in this proceeding, is now a cable network. All I'm saying is that in the broadcast carriage, the local station undoubtedly does not view a distant baseball team as a substitute for it's local team.

Q Now looking at national rights and we talked a bit about the NFL which bargains with national broadcast entities on behalf of the entire league, that is, you don't have football teams competing for the sale of national broadcast rights for their games, correct?

A That, I believe, is correct.

Q And I believe we discussed the implications of that a bit in your direct.

Turning to page 16 of your testimony, I think your concluding sentence there, "it is not reasonable to assume that selling power of the distant signal copyright holders is a sufficient condition for supra competitive prices." Do you see that?

A Yes.

Page 10110 Page 10112

let's say all the motion picture companies and those who supply syndicated programming might, if in fact, those are programs for which they are not in the eyes of the cable company reasonable substitutes.

Q But combining all of the baseballs teams as is done pursuant to the Sports Broadcasting Act means that the baseball teams aren't competing to sell rights to games to buyers such as cable systems? Is that right?

A The -- well, for the purposes of this proceeding, I mean they are indeed -- WGN is competing with TBS in offering services to cable systems and those are competing, are different. I guess even in the same link, competing baseball teams.

Q But baseball teams, the Atlanta Braves are not seeking to compete with the Chicago Cubs in selling the rights to WGN to carry the games?

A I suppose it's conceivable they could, but it doesn't -- it's not likely to be a very good substitute for Chicagoans to have the Braves replace WGN off the air.

Q But WGN and TBS are both national super

Q Is what you mean by that that even to the extent sellers would have power, market power, they still may not be able to achieve prices above competitive levels?

A Well, it's a general statement that says - that's right. That selling power can be offset by
buying power, basically, and that therefore you can't
conclude anything without knowing something about what
the powers on the other side of the table.

Q And so as an economic matter, that's why you haven't drawn a point within that shaded trapezoid as to which you would predict the price would settle?

A That's correct. We can't even be sure how the institutions will settle out, if in fact, there were no compulsory copyright and there were negotiations, marketplace negotiations among the parties.

Q If you were hypothesizing a completely free marketplace, sales of distant signal programs in a completely free marketplace, would you not have to include in that hypothesis in your assumptions that, for example, the NFL teams would be competing with

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Page 10115

each other for the sale of broadcast rights? Wouldn't that be an appropriate free market place assumption?

A Well, one can assume what one wants, but I assume that the intellectual exercise for this purpose is what would happen if we didn't have compulsory copyright, not what would happen if there were not collective organizations among the sellers of copyrighted products.

I don't see the NFL changing its negotiating approach to broadcast rights because we eliminate the compulsive copyright.

Q Well, to the extent that, for example, you looked at Program Suppliers and you assume in a hypothetical free marketplace that there would be a marketplace incentive for them to join together and collectively license the syndicated series and movies to these large cable MSOs. Would that be also a fair assumption in terms of replicating a free marketplace?

A Again, all I'm saying is that there are a large number of possibilities. We know that in years past, attempts to form such a collective were struck down by the Supreme, the 1948 U.S. versus Paramount,

allocate royalties among all of the different program claimant groups, should you not apply the same assumptions to all? And let me be specific.

If there were an antitrust constraint, a legal constraint against having all of the Program Suppliers joined together and be a single collective for licensing rights, then shouldn't one assume that the same kinds of constraints would apply to the Sports Claimants?

A I make no such assumptions. I don't know what constraints there would be and I certainly can't sit here and tell you to what extent one group would be able to organize collectively and others would not.

Q To whatever extent the current marketplace reality with respect to sports leagues reflects legislative exemptions from the antitrust laws that, in effect, take away the constraints that are normally legal protections against higher prices that result from collective licensing, to the extent that that makes a difference in what we see about Sports Claimants today, shouldn't that be somehow backed out of the equation if we're going to treat all of the

Page 10114

Page 10116

et al., right? So it's not necessarily true that that would happen, but all I'm suggesting in my testimony is that various collectives might organize to the extent that it is possible that just the organization can be difficult and legal for them to do so.

Q So there are potentially legal constraints in that imaginary marketplace that come from the antitrust laws. Is that what you're saying?

A Potential ones. I wouldn't claim to sit here and tell you that competing motion picture companies couldn't organize in this hypothetical market to sell their product collectively because obviously the entertainment market has changed a great deal since 1948 in the United States. That was just when television was beginning, as you may recall.

Q Well, here's what I'm getting at. This proceeding is only about the relative positions of the various subcategories of distant signal programming. You understand that, correct?

A Yes.

Q And if you're trying to look at a hypothetical free marketplace that would allow you to

claimant groups equally?

A I don't think you can possibly do that. I mean by analogy would you suggest that the Federal Communications Commission should change its licensing procedures from commercial broadcasting which, of course, has been highly protectionist for a long time and suggest that they ought to go for competitive local broadcast markets with deintermixture back in the 1950s and so forth?

I think we're getting into hypotheticals here that are just far beyond what anybody could possibly envision.

Q So in taking whatever marketplace, current marketplace evidence the Sports Claimants would propose in this proceeding as -- for the Panel to rely on and imagining what a hypothetical marketplace would look like, you don't think it's necessary to make any adjustment for the fact that prices in that marketplace are higher than they would otherwise be because of the antitrust law exemptions?

A I'm not sure I understand fully the prerogatives and the constraints or lack thereof on

Page 10119

this Panel, but it seems to me that would be very difficult to do and I don't see any reason for doing it. It strikes me that we can talk about a marketplace here which would unfold, given various restrictions on competition, including restrictive licensing of broadcast systems, including the Sports Broadcast Act and so forth.

Q Turning back to page 2 of your testimony and towards the end of paragraph 6.

A Yes.

JUDGE VON KANN: Let me ask a question before you move on.

I think you said a couple of answers ago that it would be very difficult to -- that there are a series of hypothetical eventualities here and it would be very difficult for anybody, including the three of us to say with great certainty exactly how this would play out in the hypothetical marketplace if the compulsory license were removed which is a view that I share. I think it's very difficult to make those predictions.

Does that suggest that, for example, it

hate to be in your shoes, even as an economist, to try to figure out the implications of all this, but -- and also, I think you have to be modest about the impact of all of this.

We're talking about a proceeding which,a s I understand it, involves \$100 million, \$120 million a year and changing the institutions or the legal institutions over how these fees are paid which may lead to an increase in the total copyright royalty revenues. Nonetheless, it's a very small share of the total markets effective year where there are broadcasters, people who sell music, people who sell motion pictures, people who sell syndicated program, people who sell -- who are involved in sports. Changing this institution isn't going to cause a wholesale change in the organization of these industries.

Now they might, in some cases organize collectively for the purpose of negotiating with one or another party in this proceeding. I think it's very difficult to figure out how all of that would settle out.

Page 10118

would probably not be appropriate for us to suppose that in this hypothetical marketplace one of the copyright hold groups would be able to organize and negotiate collectively whereas others couldn't and therefore one copyright holder is going to be a stronger force in this marketplace than another?

I think you said that you don't know for sure whether, given the way the entertainment industry is today the Program Suppliers would or wouldn't run into antitrust problems if they try to form a collective. I guess we have some amount of collective on the sports side. I suppose we have or could have it on the broadcasters' side.

I guess Public Television isn't exactly in that, but it seems to me maybe a consequence of what you've said is it would not be appropriate for the Panel to say well as between these different copyright holders, it's obvious to us that A is going to be able to organize and bargain collectively and will therefore be a much stronger force in this marketplace than B who can't.

THE WITNESS: You can do that, but I would

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JUDGE VON KANN: I do too. And does that also -- would you think that would also apply, it seems to me, to the buyer's whether or not all the cable systems in the country could organize a single collective or group of collectives for negotiating with the copyright holders without running into antitrust problems I think is a little unpredictable and difficult to be sure of.

THE WITNESS: I think what's going on on Capitol Hill at this very moment, the political problems, you probably would precede their antitrust problems if they tried to do that given the media ownership problem.

JUDGE VON KANN: Okay. BY MR. STEWART:

Q And two-thirds of the way down, paragraph 6, you say "hence, as I demonstrate in Appendix 1", do you see that?

A Yes.

Q And again, Appendix 1 was a description and a demonstration of how even if there were some degree of market power on the seller side, there would

Page 10121 Page 10123 1 be a countervailing, potentially a countervailing 1 approaches a very similar question the one the Bortz 2 effect on the buyer's side which is well rooted in 2 Survey does but from different data and analytical 3 actual fact, that is the cable systems and cable MSOs 3 perspective, is that fair? 4 as buyers might well be assumed to have some market 4 Α Yes. 5 power, is that right? 5 O See, we can agree on that also. 6 6 A Well, that's another subject. You asked MR. GARRETT: I wouldn't push your luck. 7 7 me earlier about cable system's market power as seller (Laughter.) 8 of services in their markets. 8 BY MR. STEWART: 9 9 O We're about to move on here. On page 4 O Correct. 10 10 you talk about, you say the Rosston approach provides A As buyers of programming, if they were to organize in toto as a cable industry collective and 11 a range of results. Is that right? 11 tried to buy their programming that way, yes, they 12 12 Page 4, yes. 13 would probably have market power. I doubt that 13 And the range you're talking about and 0 14 either, as you mentioned earlier, the politics or 14 specifically what you present in that table 1 are 15 15 different results when you look at just the 1998 data perhaps antitrust law would allow that to happen. 16 Going on in this sentence, you say "hence, 16 and just the 1999 data, is that right? 17 as I demonstrate in Appendix 1, even if copyright 17 On that page, yes. 18 18 holders were able to restrict supply on distant And I see. And the range also includes 19 signals, there's no reason to believe that cable 19 something we'll talk about next which is the greater 20 system operators would spend more or less in absolute 20 than zero DSE versus the greater than or equal to 1 21 terms on any programming category than their Bortz 21 DSE systems? 22 22 implied share." A Okay. Page 10122 Page 10124 1 Do you see that? 1 O Anything else? A Yes. 2 That's all I believe I've addressed in 2 3 3 Q Do you stand by that? here. I haven't attempted to test his results in 4 What I'm saying is it's indeterminate. 4 other ways. 5 That is it could be higher, it could be lower, but we 5 Q Have you read the testimony of Dr. Frankel 6 don't have -- I have no reason to believe that it 6 on behalf of the Program Suppliers Claimants in this 7 would break one way or the other. 7 proceeding? 8 8 Now we're back to where you and I agree. A You'll have to remind me which one that 9 (Laughter.) 9 is. 10 A Okay. 10 He is the statistician who, among other Q Let's turn the page. Page 3 you talk 11 things, looked at what happened to the coefficients 11 12 about Dr. Rosston's regression analysis? 12 when you took subscribers out or you put receipts in 13 A Right. 13 or you did a --Looking at paragraph 9, you actually say 14 14 Α I have not looked at that, I'm sorry. 15 that the Rosston regression analysis is corroborative 15 So you're not referring to his testimony 16 or supports the Bortz results. Is that right? 16 or his points when you talk about the range of 17 A I'm saying that for particularly the Joint 17 results? 18 Sports Claimants the numbers come out fairly close and 18 A No. I'm talking about separate estimates 19 in fact, I point out that they come out within 95 19 that I did for 1998 and 1999 and also separate results 20 percent confidence interval on Dr. Rosston's results, 20 which were reported in part by Dr. Rosston for DSE 21 21 greater than zero or DSE greater than or equal to 1. yes.

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And Dr. Rosston's regression analysis

Now looking first at the 1998 versus 1999

Page 10127

calculations. Basically what you did was to divide the 7,529 observations into those that occurred in the two accounting periods in 1998 and those that occurred in the two accounting periods of 1999. And just run the exact same regression on those two subsets of the data?

A Yes, of course there will be a change in those dummy variables to indicate to time period.

Q That's right because Dr. Rosston's regression did include variables that were intended to measure the extent to which changes over time or the actual accounting period that was in the study affected the royalties. Is that right?

A Yes.

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Q And his results reported some coefficients for those time variables, right?

A Yes, his time dummies, yes.

Q How are you suggesting in your analysis of these two separate subsets that there was a change that occurred between the two years?

A Yes, when I ran those things separately, and performed a statistical test, I was unable to

this is a standard econometric test to determine whether you should estimate this thing over the entire domain of the sample or whether there's been a shift in the relationship between different syndromes of the same.

Q It would actually work out if you applied the commercial TV percentage you've measured here for 1998 and the one you've measured for 1999, that the percentage of the total royalties for those two years for commercial television would be higher than the combined results that Dr. Rosston presented?

A I'm sorry, you'll have to ask that question again.

Q The Fund was roughly the same in both years if you just take the average of your two separate year numbers, you come out with a number that's higher than 10.9?

A For 1998, the number for commercial broadcasters for 1999 is not significantly different from zero.

Q But with respect to the point estimate

Page 10126

Page 10128

reject the hypothesis that they really are different results, that is there are two separate results that are similar in those two years.

O Sorry, would you say that again?

A I'm sorry, when I ran them separately and ran the statistical test, the so-called Chow Test on them, I was able to reject the hypothesis that they were drawn from the same pool, that is, that they were subject to the same statistical relationship over the two years.

Q What would be your explanation? Why was there a difference, if there was, between the relative value of the program categories in 1999 versus 1998?

A Well, the conclusion one draws from that isn't necessarily that there's a difference in the value of programming between those two years, but rather that that regression over those two periods to come up with an answer. That is there is something that is being omitted here that's changing. I don't know what it is, but it could be -- there are lot of problems of the specification of the regression. But

that results from the running of the regression, that is the best estimate of what the share is. Is that correct?

A That's the best estimate, but you cannot reject the hypothesis that it is any different from zero. So you would not wish to base any decision on it.

Q You talked about --

JUDGE GULIN: Are you saying that the commercial TV share of 8.5 percent is not significantly different from zero?

THE WITNESS: The regression coefficient which generates the 8.75 percent estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero.

JUDGE VON KANN: Is that only true with respect to commercial TV?

JUDGE GULIN: You said the Canadian coefficient is not so different for 1998 or 1999.

THE WITNESS: The regressions for 1998 and 1999 are in appendix three, and those coefficients which have no asterisk whatsoever are not statistically significant. One asterisk means 10

Page 10131

1 percent confidence level, two means 5 percent, and 2 three means 1 percent. So that, for instance, in 3 1999, Canadian and commercial TV are not significant. 4 In 1998 Canadian and low power are not significant.

BY MR. STEWART:

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- Q Now with respect to your greater than zero versus greater than or equal to one subgroups, on which you ran your analysis, you also ran something called the Wald test to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between the results you got using one group versus the other. Is that right?
- Α Yes, and that's in footnote seven here.
- 14 I have it in footnote eight.
- 15 I have footnote seven.
- 16 Q I see. It looks like there's another
- 17 seven back on page five. Is that a footnote? Yes.
- 18 In my version, it's corrected and it is in footnote
- 19 eight. But it is the first footnote at the bottom of
- 20 page six that you're referring to. Is that right?
- 21 A Yes, and it's a footnote from paragraph 13 22 after the word significant.

Page 10130

Page 10132

- 1 Q Right. That's where you describe having 2 done the Wald test on those?
- 3 Yes.

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- Q Did you do the Wald test with respect to the 1998 and 1999 subtest subgroups?
- A I just did a Chow test.
- 7 O And what did you find?
- 8 And found that there is a statistically,
- 9 I believe and I have to refresh my memory, I think 10 they were statistically different. I can't remember
- 11 that now.

Hang on one second while I look at this. No, I may not have done the Chow. Let me retract that. I don't, at this point, remember if there was a Chow test run to determine whether those two were statistically different.

17 Q I'd like to hand you what I've asked to be 18 marked as 54-RX.

19 (Whereupon, the above-referred 20 to document was marked as NAB 21 98-99 Exhibit 54-RX for 22 identification.)

1 And this is the results of the Wald test, 2 run with respect to the 1998 and 1999 tests.

- This is the 1998 and 1999?
- Q Yes. This was not done by me.
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- 0 And I'm happy to say that I have learned if you turn to the last page and look at the last number you can tell what you need to tell from this.
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- 0 Okay. You see that where it says probability greater than F equals .955?
- O And that means that without going through what the null hypothesis is and so on, that means that based on the Wald test, there is no statistically significant difference between the results reported for this 1998 subgroup and the 1999 subgroup. Is that right?
- Right. I'm sorry, in my previous answer on the Wald test, the Wald test and the Chow test I ran on the zero and greater than one. I was mistaken on the 1998 and 1999. There was no test run, or if

there was I don't recall what the result was.

Q Are you able to read the --

It will take me, first of all, my training in econometrics goes back quite a few years, as I'm sure you can tell. But I do this sort of work all the time. The problem is the format of these reports differs across statistical packages. But I certainly, in the end analysis, these are always F tests for

9 these sorts of tests and you're quite right. The F 10 test is not statistically significant.

> MR. GARRETT: I just want to make clear. This was a document -- you're an economist. This is not something we produced.

> MR. STEWART: That's correct. NERA ran this test at my request, and these were the results.

I guess Dr. Crandall, I'd like to give you whatever moments you need to, whatever time you need to review that to see if there are any glaring errors. But would you --

THE WITNESS: It would be very hard to determine from the printout exactly, without the data set, exactly what was done. I presume that what you

Page 10135 Page 10133 told me is correct, namely that the sample was 1 But the numbers are what the numbers are and we're bifurcated between 1998 and 1999 and a test was run in 2 perfectly happy to do our own check and then see this fashion, an analysis of variance to determine 3 whether or not we can submit something here that whether in fact there was a shift in structure. And 4 confirms it one way or another. 5 But certainly, as Dr. Crandall sits here you rejected the hypothesis that were was. 6 BY MR. STEWART: now and even at a break, he is not going to be able to 7 Q The result indicated on the last page of verify that Mr. Stewart's econometrician has done all 8 this 54-RX implies that there is no statistically of this properly. significant difference between the shares that you 9 JUDGE VON KANN: That's reasonable. 10 report when you do the 1998 and 1999 regression MR. STEWART: I guess I would move for the 11 admission of 54-RX for impeachment purposes subject to separately. 12 A I believe that is what it says, but I 13 would have to look at it and spend some time with it, MR. GARRETT: I have no objection to that. and I could certainly report back. 14 JUDGE VON KANN: So received. 15 (The document, having been What the result of the F test says on the 16 last page is a conclusion that there's no statistical marked previously for difference, is that right? 17 identification as NAB 98-99 18 Exhibit 54-RX, was received in A Depending on what the F test was, yes. 19 evidence.) And now we need to know what the hypothesis being tested was and at this point, I can't tell what all is 20 JUDGE YOUNG: Dr. Crandall, I just want to going into this. I need to spend some more time with 21 make sure I understand. You separated out the results 22 it. for 1998 and 1999 on the model that dealt with all Page 10134 Page 10136 1 DSEs over zero. Correct? Q Well, I would ask that you do that at a 2 THE WITNESS: Yes, for the entire set. break, because you ran the Wald test on greater than 3 JUDGE YOUNG: And you came up with the zero, greater than or equal to one, correct? 4 results, and what Mr. Stewart is asking you to do is Yes. And you did that in order to determine 5 to look at a test that his person performed which 0 whether it is a statistically significant difference. 6 shows, he says, that there's no significant 7 Right? differences between the results that you obtained 8 A Yes. untangling the two years from the combined result. Is 9 Q And did you run any such tests on the 1998 that what we have here? and 1999? 10 Is he asking you to say that this is --11 there's no significant, statistically significant A That's what I was trying to recall. And I don't recall. I thought my recollection was I was 12 difference between the two years. 13 going to do a Chow test on it. But I'm not sure I THE WITNESS: The latter is my did. 14 understanding of what he is doing. 15 Well, if you wouldn't mind taking a look JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. And you've in another 16 at this and confirming to the extent that you're able part of your testimony, figured out the implied 17 that it shows that in fact there's no difference results, implied share results for DSEs over one and

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over zero?

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that.

between the 1998 and 1999 results I would appreciate

here, subject to check. I don't know if he's going to

be able to check all these numbers here in the break.

MR. GARRETT: I'm happy to accept this

you're saying that you did do tests to show there's no

between the results for the DSEs over one and the DSEs

THE WITNESS: No, there is a significant

significant, statistically significant difference

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1 difference.

JUDGE YOUNG: There is a significant difference.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

JUDGE VON KANN: Okay, Mr. Stewart?

BY MR. STEWART:

Q Dr. Crandall, with respect to your first point on pages four and over to the top of five that when you run the 1998 and 1999 results separately, the Rosston data and model produced -- provide a range of results. If it is the case that when you run the Wald test there's no statistically significant difference between the results from 1998 and 1999, your point that the Rosston regression should be discounted because it produces a range of results when comparing 1998 and 1999 is incorrect. Is that right?

A I think it's, however, the fact that there is some variation here, and a rather substantial variation including the lack of significance on the commercial TV coefficient, there's something more we'll want to take into account. It is certainly true that there's enough variation here that you cannot

1 regression thing. But one of the questions of the

2 Panel was how should they treat the greater than one

3 or equal to one and the greater than zero results.

4 Should they average them and so forth? And I conclude

5 that surely, at least you should consider the greater

6 than equal to one as strongly as you do greater than

zero. You might even conclude that it's superior, but
 there are problems with the whole Rosston regression

there are problems with the whole Rosston regression analysis that I wouldn't suggest that it be relied on

10 anyway.

Q Okay, and I want to make sure we get a chance to discuss those reasons separately. But with respect to just the greater than zero, greater than or equal to one. The greater than or equal to one data set represents fewer observations. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Do you know how many fewer?

18 A I say in here somewhere. Looks like 19 approximately 759.

Q Now and you say that you're referring to paragraph 15 on page 6?

22 A Yes.

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Page 10140

conclude that the two regressions are statistically significantly different.

Q Next, lets look at your discussion of the greater than zero and greater than or equal to one starting on page five of your testimony.

A Yes.

Q And I guess your conclusion over on the top of page seven is that the panel should give no less weight to the greater than or equal to one DSE model than to the one presented by Dr. Rosston. Is that right?

A That's what I say. Yes.

Q And why do you say it should be given no less weight?

A Well, that's a conservative way of saying that at least you don't give it less weight. That you simply don't rely solely on the DSE greater than zero estimate.

Q You don't rely solely on it?

A Right, if you're to rely at all. Keep in mind that this is against the background which I think there's significant problems with the whole Rosston

Q You respond to Dr. Rosston's suggestion during his testimony that it's better in a multiple regression to use the data set that provide data so that you can, because multiple regressions are designed to tease out and extract the relationship among the variables. So the more data you have, the better it is and as a general matter. You agree with that proposition as a general matter?

A As a general matter, yes. You can get -it is probably better to have more observations since
you can draw, you are more likely to obtain
statistically significant results.

Q Okay. And in fact, you then went on to apply the Wald test in this context and find that there was a statistically significant difference between the two versions, right?

A Yes.

Q And in fact, we know that the coefficients measured in the greater than zero, the bigger data set, 7,529 is what it was, produces tighter confidence intervals. That is more precise coefficient measurements. Is that right?

Page 10143

A I don't recall whether that is generally true or whether the goodness of fit is better in general. I don't know. I don't remember. We could look at it.

Q Dr. Rosston actually testified that the coefficients were tighter or more precisely estimated when you used the big data set, use all of the data available to you.

A All of the coefficients?

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That are greater than zero. I don't know.

A I wouldn't be surprised about that.

12 It's in the record, right? Dr. Rosston 13 presented the coefficients at confidence intervals for 14 both of these data sets in his direct testimony, 15 correct?

> A That's my recollection. I don't have his testimony in front of me.

So let's proceed from that assumption that the coefficients measured with the complete data set were more precisely measured. You have shown that in fact, when you add the extra 759, when you consider the extra 759 observations, you get a measure that is

1 than zero to the one and more. And the reason for 2 this is that there is no price in the regression. And

3 the copyright rate, under the compulsory license

4 scheme is changing as you go from zero to one to one

5 and a fraction and so forth. And there's no

6 independent variable factoring the copyright fee, your 7 royalty rate.

Q Let me just make sure we're clear on this. Your statement there, the second sentence of paragraph 15 says the marginal information gleaned from the extra 759 observations is likely small. Do you see that?

Α Yes.

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0 You've gone the next step and measured the difference provided by the marginal information gleaned from the extra 759 observations, and you have shown, you've demonstrated that it is statistically significant.

A But they are different. That is the two regressions run on subsets of the same data set give you statistically different results. So how are you going to chose between them?

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statistically different from the one where you use only part of your observations. And just as a general matter, from an econometrics perspective, wouldn't the broader data set be superior?

A I might do something else though. I might look and see what is the relationship for those 759 observations. And when you run the Rosston regression on those alone, you get very poor results.

Q I want to get to that. But your statement that Dr. Rosston's argument is unpersuasive because the marginal information gleaned from the extra 759 observations is likely small, is actually disproved by you when you run the Wald test. Right?

A You get different results. The improvement in the goodness of fit is maybe offset by the fact that in fact you have two very separate samples in which your relationship is quite different. I haven't looked at the tightness of fit of the regression coefficients and we should go over that, if you want to discuss it.

But what I'm finding here is that the relationship is different as you move from the greater Page 10144

Q Including the marginal information gleaned from the extra 759 observations, may be small from a colloquial perspective, but from a statistical perspective it is big enough to be significant, correct?

A Well, it has a significant effect on the estimation suggesting that those 759, the relationship among those 759 is different among the rest of them and therefore shouldn't be in the same regression.

Q And that is what you lay out in your Appendix Two?

Α Yes.

13 Would you explain what that Appendix Two 14 is?

> A Appendix Two runs a regression, Rosston regression, over the entire domain of the variables but includes a dummy variable indicated for carriage of one or more DSEs and then interacts that dummy variable with each of the programming types. And then asks the question for whether the Wald test is done of whether the results are statistically different when the one or more DSE variable is zero, i.e. they are

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not carrying one or more DSEs, and the interaction of that dummy variable with the programming variables are all zero. And the Wald test on that as you see, those 2.39 which is statistically significant, or the 2.6 percent probability or confidence level.

Q We're on page 18, the last number there. Probability, prob greater than F equals 0.026?

A Right.

Q And that's the same format as in exhibit -

A It is a similar test to the one, yes, that you showed in the other one.

JUDGE VON KANN: Dr. Crandall, let Mr. Stewart finish the questions so it makes for cleaner transcript. We can know what your answer is.

THE WITNESS: Sorry.

BY MR. STEWART:

Q And it is because of the fact that the probability of greater than F shown on the last page of 54-RX is close to 1.955 that you can conclude from a statistical analysis perspective that there was no significant difference between 1998 and 1999 here

A Once you move above one, then the cable system actually has to pay something in addition and therefore has a higher marginal price for the signals which contribute to DSEs greater than one.

Q Now cable systems that have say 0.5 DSEs, provide some information about the fact that they've only distant signals that get them 0.5 DSEs, right? That is, they haven't bought the next DSE that takes them over one. Is that right?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. And the particular distant signals that they have selected, with the programming on those distant signals, provides some evidence, because of the fact that they're actually paid for by the cable operator about royalties that those cable operators pay in single programs, correct?

A I don't quite understand your question. Could you repeat it? I'm sorry.

Q Those cable operators did -- are paying royalties for those distant signal programs that they carry, is that right? They've selected those particular ones?

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because the number is small, not close to one. You conclude that there is a statistically significant difference between the two runs of the regression?

A Yes, that is a probability level for rejecting or accepting the hypothesis of equality.

Q Now you say back on page six that when you conclude the system of DSEs between, I'm sorry, the positive DSEs less than one, combined some signals that were purchased at higher prices implying higher marginal values. Do you see that? Towards the end.

A Yes

Q What do you mean by that?

A Let me read the whole thing.

14 (Pause.)

Well, under the current structure of the compulsory copyright, everyone must pay for at least one DSE. So those people that are in that group of greater than zero, but less than or equal to one, are paying nothing for an incremental signal.

Q At least in the royalty rate. Are those the ones at which you would say that there's an implication of higher marginal values?

A They're paying for one DSE whether they select those or not. Therefore, the marginal cost of selecting 0.25 or 0.5, in your example, is zero.

Q Is that the actual total marginal cost?

A Well, the marginal rate is zero. If, in fact, they raise the price of basic service or they obtain more subscribers, then they will have to pay some incremental royalty rate. But if we were looking into signal for which they actually paid money, that is over and above one, there they're paying not only for any enhanced subscriptions, any potential increase in the basic rate if they can make one, but also they're paying higher copyright rate.

Q So, with respect to the first point you made, you agree with Dr. Rosston to the extent distant signals picked up by cable operators that don't total one DSE increase the number of subscribers they are able to attract or allow them to increase their subscription fee, then the carriage of those distant signals does produce an increase in the actual royalty amounts that are paid as opposed to the rate?

A For that to be true, yes, your

1 hypothetical would be correct. However, when one

- 2 estimates the Rosston regression over just those cable
- 3 systems that paid between zero and greater than zero
- 4 DSEs and less than one, that is, those excluded
- 5 observations we were talking about earlier, it is
- 6 impossible to find a statistically significant
- 7 coefficient on most of the programming categories.
- 8 Indeed, I think one of them, Devotionals, comes out
- 9 negative. And only Program Suppliers comes out

10 statistically significantly positive.

So there seems to be in that range very little effect in his sample, subscribers or at least something that is generating an increase in royalty payments, since that is his dependent variable.

Q You're aware, are you not, that there is a significant number, there was a significant number in 1998 and 1999 of Form Three cable operators who pay the minimum fee and don't carry any distant signals, right?

20 A Yes.

Q And what would be your explanation for that phenomenon?

uses of that channel. Correct?

A It represents a choice by him and indeed economics certainly must enter into it. I mean, politics could enter into it, too. There may be some reasons in the local politics for importing certain signals because of the relationship with the franchising authority. I don't know, but I would generally expect some effect on his bottom line from importing a distant signal.

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What I'm telling you is that in the regression analysis of Rosston, which I'm trying to explain here, there doesn't seem to be one for the most part.

MR. STEWART: This would be an appropriate time for a break.

JUDGE VON KANN: Sure. Let's take 15 minutes.

(Whereupon, the proceedings went off the record at 11:00 a.m. and resumed at 11:19 a.m.)

JUDGE YOUNG: Dr. Crandall, on page 6, in paragraph 14, you say, "If the panel was implying to consider both models, it should consider them both

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A They make programming choices that they think are better. Or they have alternatives that are better than importing a distant signal.

Q One reminds that the point you're making earlier about the relative significance of this distant signal marketplace to the businesses of the various groups represented here. In the cable industry a distant signal, the channels occupied by distant signals are relatively a very small part of the service offered by the cable operators. Correct?

A Relatively small in terms of the proportion of channels you mean?

Q Yes.

A I think that is true. Yes.

Q And the cable operators are driven by maximizing their profits across the services that they provide. Correct?

A Certainly.

Q And so the decision to carry a distant signal, even if it doesn't get up to the level of matching 1.0 DSEs, represents an economic choice by the cable operator with respect to his alternative

equally." What do you mean by that?

THE WITNESS: Well, the problem here, as I was beginning to explain to Mr. Stewart, is that it's difficult because of the problems with the general model to determine which is the superior approach to predicting supposed programming values here, whether it is using all of those between greater than zero or just those greater than or equal to one.

JUDGE YOUNG: Assume we buy that. And then we want to try to see what you ask us to do or you suggest we do.

THE WITNESS: Well, there is no mathematical formula I can suggest to you. What I do say, though, is that you shouldn't average the two because one is a subset of the other.

And then I have given you some evidence today that -- and those signals that are in the DSE greater than zero but not in the sample for DSE greater than or equal to one, that the model doesn't do very well. I mean, my preferences would clearly be for the greater than, equal to one category.

But I have problems with the whole

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approach. So it is hard for me to recommend that you use one of them.

JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Well, I guess that's a good segue back to where you were about to ask questions.

JUDGE GULIN: Let me follow that. If we were to conclude that this should be given equal value, I understand we can't average them as a mathematical matter because of the overlapping data sets, but we could take the midpoint, not call it an average, right? I am not saying those are the same. It just wouldn't be calling it an average, correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I suppose you could do anything you wish. I am just suggesting that doing the mathematical operation of averaging, there is no basis in the science of all of this for doing that. How you consider them is your judgment.

MR. GARRETT: Don't tell them they can do anything.

THE WITNESS: You don't believe they will?
BY MR. STEWART:

Q Dr. Crandall, turning to pages 8 and 9 of

commercial minutes may be about the same if they were
about the same broadcast day. Yet, clearly to the
cable operator, the commercial station is of
considerably greater value, having paid the 3.75 rate
to get it.

Q First of all, it is the purpose of a multiple regression analysis to look at many observations, correct?

A Yes.

Q And to include relevant variables that affect what you are interested in, in this case royalties, correct?

A Yes.

Q And it is to observe all of the relationships among all of those variables, among all of those observations, and try to isolate and extract the influence of each of the variables separately, holding all of the other things constant, correct?

A That's the intent.

Q In fact, there is no step in which Dr. Rosston's regression credits PBS -- put it this way. For one observation among the 7,529, there's no step

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your testimony, here you discuss what you say is a problem with the Rosston regression methodology. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And, in particular, it has to do with the treatment of the 3.75 rate as it relates to PBS signals. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q At the top of page 9, you talk about a simple example, which you set up at the bottom of page 8. And then at the top of page 9, you describe how Rosston's model would allocate the royalties in this simple example. Is that right?

A Well, it does not say that Dr. Rosston's model would give you exactly these results, but what it points out is that when you are buying a pool of signals, which includes a PBS signal and a 3.75 commercial signal, and then you take the total royalty payment for that combination and relate it to minutes on the commercial signal and minutes on the PBS signal, that it would tend to overstate the value of the PBS minutes because the PBS minutes and the

in which PBS is credited with 50 percent of theroyalties here. Is that right?

A That is correct. It's not precisely 50
percent. The point is that it relates this entire
payment to two buckets of minutes: PBS minutes and
the commercial station minutes.

Q It relates the entire payment --

A Right.

9 Q -- to each of those buckets or, actually, 10 in your example, three different buckets for that one 11 observation, right?

A Yes.

Q And let's just assume also for simplicity that there is another system among the 7,529 that is exactly the same, carries exactly the same 2 signals, but it is in a different market size and, hence, doesn't have to pay 3.75 for the independent station.

18 Okay?

A Uh-huh.
Q And if both of those are in the regression, then the regression operates to observe the difference between those two, correct?

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In fact, Dr. Rosston's analysis included a variable for 3.75 royalty payments, did it not?

Α Yes, it did.

And the purpose of that variable is to extract the influence of the 3.75 rate structure on the royalties, correct?

Yes.

O So that if it was properly done, the overstatement of the PBS royalties in your hypothetical example would be, in effect, stepped up by the 3.75 variable and not reflected in the coefficient for public broadcasting?

Yes, if the effect of 3.75 across all of these observations were exactly the same. I doubt it is. But also keep in mind my earlier criticism, which is that there is no price variable on the right-hand side.

I mean, the way one would typically run a regression of this sort is to estimate what DSEs an operator would take as a function of the prices he would pay and the attributes of those signals.

1 royalties?

> A Well, if you have price of basic service and subscribers times the royalty rate, that's the definition. However, I believe, at least the way I would approach this and I think many empirical economists would approach this, is you would first estimate what signals the cable system would take. So you would not do a regression of revenues on these right-hand side variables, but, rather, you would take -- you would do a discreet choice model to be appropriate or logit model, taking a choice. What's the probability of taking one DSE, 1.25 DSE, and so forth, as a function of what is on those signals and the price of doing so.

That's an interesting suggestion. Maybe I'll try that next time unless we're allowed to rely on the Bortz study. If you put in all of the terms that define the price, if you put all of the terms in that are equivalent to the royalties on the right-hand side of the regression, you introduce some difficulties because of the co-linearity between or is it --

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That is not what is being done here. Rather, you only have a total royalty payments, on one side, and then minutes in all the programming, on the other side.

Q About prices, you mean the DSE rates?

It would be -- yes. It would be the DSE rates times the -- you have to account for differences in the price of the basic service as well, but because that multiplies by the DSE rate to give you the price of your --

I'm sorry. Are you finished? Q

12 Α Yes.

13 Isn't that just the definition of 14 royalties? Isn't that just the formula by which the 15 royalties are calculated?

> Isn't what? Α

If you put in the subscriber fee and the number of subscribers and the DSEs and the DSE rates and whether any is the 3.75, that is an effective price term that you are talking about, correct?

That is correct.

0 Isn't that just the definition of Page 10160

You're estimating the tautology, then, yes. You're not estimating anything. That's right. If you put P and Q on the left-hand side and P and Q on the right-hand side, you're not estimating anything.

And going back to the question here you have at the top of page 9, it is the case that if you assume with me that Dr. Rosston's analysis was run correctly, his use of the variable for 3.75 royalties should have avoided an over-crediting of the PBS royalties in the simple example that you give?

A I doubt if it would because it's an additive variable. And I think it probably would have to be multiplicative times the commercial signals. There's a real problem with specification here, but my problem here is that I don't believe you learn much from this kind of a regression.

And that's because you think it needed price on the right-hand side as well?

It's the whole conceptual model, theoretical model, would start with "What does the cable guide take?" because you meet his demand

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Page 10163

function. And this is a common way of deciding how to
measure the value of various services. And whether
it's your choice of travel mode or whether it's the
cable system's choice of programming, that would be
the preferred way to go about it.

Q Well, the data available showed what the cable operators actually selected, correct? Those are the distant signals they carried?

A Yes.

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Q And it showed the total amounts they actually paid for those distant signal programs that they purchased, correct?

A I believe that's correct. Yes, sir.

Q And if you were to use this price function that you suggested, would you not also introduce the potential problem of the difference between the DSE structure and the actual relative marketplace value to the cable operator?

A I don't think there's a problem there the way I understand your question. What you want to know is at the margin, what does it cost them to take, say, WGN? And does he take it relative to a variety of

something about the demand, price elasticity, demand for gasoline in a market in which taxes are lower or taxes don't exist.

Q The Bortz survey in your view does measure those relative values. Is that right?

A Relative values of what?

Q The program categories to cable operators.

A Well, it asks for cable operators, yes, to allocate a budget. And, therefore, it must reflect his relative assessment of the values.

Q Okay. Let's turn to your next section E, "Rosston's model does not account for the supposed seller-side problem." Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Did you use the word "supposed" because you think it is not a problem? Is that right?

A It might have been an injudicious choice of word. I should have probably said "alleged" or something like that. Because it hasn't been raised before, I don't know that anybody has demonstrated exactly what the seller-side problem is any detail. But it refers back to the history of the supplier side

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other choices open to him?

Q Well, we know what the cable operator paid for WGN along with the other signals that he carried, correct? That's what's in the Rosston regression?

A What's in the Rosston regression are his total royalties on the left-hand side, which is a product of that rate times his basic reference.

Q If you introduced the variable that reflected DSE rate differences between different types of signals, for example, you would now be including the legislative decisions that went into making the statutory rate structure, correct?

A That's correct.

Q That's not a marketplace price structure. Is that right?

A That is probably not the price structure that would emerge from a fully negotiated -- a market in which these rates are freely negotiated, but it would tell you a lot about the cable system's demand function.

Just because we tax gasoline, for instance, does mean to say that we can't deduce

or seller's perspective that has emerged from these proceedings.

Q Is your view any different with respect to the Rosston model than it is with respect to the Bortz survey results?

A I don't believe either one of them formally attempts to take account of what would happen to the supply side of the market.

Q All right. Let's look at the specific suggestions you make. Do you see there at the bottom of page 9, you say, "Commercial broadcasters urged Congress to enact legislation that would permit regulation of the cable operators' charge"? Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Bear with me for a moment here. Let's look at the context of the 1992 Cable Act. Certainly in 1992, cable operators were, in effect, a monopoly in the multi-channel video programming market, correct, by and large?

A They had market power. I can't remember when DirecTV first launched. You would have to remind

Page 10165 Page 10167 1 me. That would determine my --1 stations and thereby reduce their advertising revenues 2 Mid to late '90s. 2 accordingly, I would expect. 3 A Okay. 3 Q Cable operators were also selling 4 Q So the answer is yes? 4 advertising time on cable networks, correct? 5 5 So the answer is yes. They probably still At that time? Yes. 6 have market power today, and they had market power at 6 0 7 7 that time. Yes. I don't recall whether it was very 8 8 0 And there were lots of consumer complaints important at that time. It has certainly grown over about substantial success of increases in cable 9 9 time. 10 10 subscription prices, right? But it's the rates that There were complaints from broadcasters Q 11 cable operators charge their subscribers? 11 and reported by the NAB about abuse by cable operators 12 12 of their position, for example, in refusing to carry A My recollection is there were and there 13 were also lots of complaints for consumer groups. How 13 a station, local television station, on the same 14 many consumer complaints there were I don't know. 14 channel in which it was broadcast. Are you aware of 15 15 Now, at that point most cable systems that? 16 carried most local broadcast stations, notwithstanding 16 I'm aware of problems in that respect. Α that there were no must-carry rules in place. Is that 17 17 And I wouldn't be surprised if there were complaints 18 18 as a result of it. right? 19 A Nineteen ninety-two is 13 years after the 19 Q And from a cable operator's perspective, 20 appeal of all those signal carriage rules at the FCC. 20 putting, say, channel 4 up on channel 67 and having 21 And there was a growth of -- substantial growth of UHF 21 the cable networks on which advertising could be sold 22 22 stations. As I recall, it started around 1980. down in the lower channels would be advantageous from Page 10166 Page 10168 1 1 Whether the cable systems carried most of them or not, a business perspective, correct? 2 I don't know. I'd have to look at the lineups. 2 A I believe that's correct. I'm not a 3 3 You don't know the exact facts on that? student of channel placement on cable systems, but 4 A 4 Not at -- as I sit here, no. that is certainly the common lore in its published 5 But it is the case that cable operators in 5 record. 6 a television market had incentives to carry the ABC, 6 Is it fair to say, would you agree that 7 7 CBS, and NBC affiliates. Is that right? the principal concern of the broadcast, commercial 8 8 A Oh, certainly. broadcast, industry in the 1992 legislative 9 They did so voluntarily? 9 consideration was in assuring carriage of other A I would think for the most part, they did 10 10 stations on the local cable systems and actually on 11 channel and actually without degradation of the signal 11 it voluntarily, sir. 12 Now, cable systems were also competitors 12 and so on? of local broadcast stations, correct? 13 13 I'm not as I sit here an expert on the 14 14 past lobbying activities of the National Association Α Oh, yes. 15 Q In what ways? 15 of Broadcasters. My recollection of that issue, 16 Well, the cable systems offered viewing 16 though, was that one of their major concerns, a 17 alternatives to the commercial broadcast stations' 17 principal concern, was to be able to get that carriage 18 offerings. 18 at a zero price. 19 19 Which affected the advertising sales in Q A zero price to them? 20 the local market of the broadcast stations? 20 Yes, under must-carry. Right. A 21 Certainly it would reduce the --21 I want to just show you a document that 22 presumably reduce the audiences of the commercial 22 has been introduced previously as an exhibit. I see

Page 10171 Page 10169 1 Mr. Garrett has already pulled it out, NAB exhibit 1 highlighted sentence on the next page, please? 2 2. 17-X. Have you seen this document? "Finally, if reasonable must-carry and 3 A I have no idea. I don't think so, but let 3 channel positioning rules are adopted, the 4 me see it. Mr. Garrett may not have shared it with 4 broadcasting industry should have no direct interest 5 5 in whether cable's rates are reregulated." 6 0 It's testimony of Eddie Fritts, who is NAB 6 Now, the reference to channel positioning 7 7 president, in April of 1989 before the Subcommittee of issues, that relates to the issue that you said you 8 Antitrust Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate 8 were familiar with and about which you said you 9 Judiciary Committee. 9 wouldn't be surprised if there had been complaints. 10 And this was a consideration of 10 Is that right? 11 legislation that was a multi-year process that led to 11 A Yes. 12 the 1992 Cable Act. Are you aware of that? 12 0 Now, looking at your testimony here at the A Yes. 13 13 top of page 10 and footnote 11, which cites JSC 14 Q Would you read this sentence on -exhibit 2, do you see that? 14 15 15 JUDGE von KANN: Mr. Stewart, my Yes. 16 recollection is we covered some of this terrain pretty 16 What is JSC exhibit 2? Q 17 17 well I think with prior witnesses. I am not It's an exhibit in this proceeding. precluding you obviously, but I believe we had this 18 18 What did it say? Why do you cite it? 0 19 before, did we not, and --19 I can't remember what's on it, but it 20 MR. STEWART: We did, but it's necessary 20 refers to this lobbying before the Federal 21 I think to set the context for cross-examination of 2.1 Communications Commission, I believe. 22 22 Dr. Crandall. This was the period immediately after the Page 10170 Page 10172 1 1992 Cable Act was passed, in which the FCC was 1 JUDGE von KANN: All right. BY MR. STEWART: 2 adopting its regulation rules, its must-carry rules, 2 3 3 Q Would you read the highlighted sentence on and so on. Is that right? 4 4 A I believe -- well, they were certainly page 309? 5 MR. GARRETT: Let me just take a look at 5 adopting the rules necessary to carry out the '92 Act. 6 б So those -- all of those were probably in play as well it, please. 7 7 THE WITNESS: "For the television" -as the rate regulation rules, with which I'm more 8 MR. GARRETT: Wait. 8 familiar. 9 9 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Q And you say that the broadcasters urged 10 the FCC to reduce the monthly fee that monthly 10 (Pause.) JUDGE von KANN: Do you want him to read 11 subscribers are charged for cable service from 11 12 it into the record or read it to himself? 12 approximately \$16 or \$4.50. Do you see that? 13 13 Α MR. STEWART: Into the record, please. Yes. 14 JUDGE von KANN: All right. 14 Q Have you read those comments? 15 15 THE WITNESS: "For the television Yes, I did some time ago, actually prior 16 16 to my original submission in this proceeding. So it industry, must-carry and related channel positioning 17 17 regulations are a must. This is the single most has been some time. 18 important step Congress can take to reinstitute fair 18 And you're aware that there is an attached 19 19 study. And what NAB was proposing was an approach to competition between cable and broadcast." 20 20 rate regulation that based on the numbers, MR. STEWART: Okay. 21 BY MR. STEWART: 21 preliminary, what they call preliminary numbers, would 22 And would you flip the page and read the 22 have arrived at an average rate at something around

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1 \$4.50?

A I don't recall the details of how they got

3 there.

Q The FCC didn't adopt that approach, did they?

A The FCC adopted a variety of approaches
and changed their mind. We would have to compare that
document you are talking about with what they finally
did. I don't know how close they came to that

approach.

Q Well, you wrote a book on what they did. Is that right?

13 A Yes.

Q In essence, what they did was to freeze the rates at a certain time around that period of time and then mandate reductions, first a ten percent reduction, then a seven percent reduction, in the basic rate. Is that right?

A I don't remember the details, but they ran several regressions, a term that we have used in this proceeding a lot, and ran different regressions over time. And so they changed their mind over time as to

Q We can establish this by looking at what the statute was at the time. Let me just represent to you, then, that for some significant number of cable systems located in the television market within the ADI or DMA of the television station, even though the FCC's rule said cable operator has to carry that station because it's local, it's within the market, the Copyright Act definition still was based on the 1976 must-carry rules. So there were situations in which you actually did distant signal, even though you were in the local television market of the television station.

A I guess that could be true. I really have never examined this proposition.

Q Are you aware of the aspect of the FCC's must-carry rules that required the television station to reimburse the cable operator for copyright royalties if there were a situation like that?

A No, I am not.

Q Again, that's in the FCC's rules to this day. And we can establish it. I would like to ask you to assume that that is the case.

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how much those rates should have to be rolled back.

Q But \$16 to \$4.50 is like a 75 percent reduction. Is that right?

A Something like that, yes.

Q And that wasn't what the FCC did, was it?

A No, I don't believe there is anything like a 75 percent rollback.

Q Now, the other point that was made I think when JSC exhibit 2 was presented in the direct phase, was that the broadcast NAB in those pleadings said the basic tier should include all broadcast stations other than superstations. Are you aware of that?

A I am not aware of what NAB's lobbying was on that.

Q Are you aware of the fact that at that particular period in time, there was a difference between the definition of local stations from the FCC's perspective and the definition of local from the Copyright Act perspective?

A I am aware that that has changed over time, but I am not aware of what the difference was at that time.

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A Explain it to me one more time. What is in the rules exactly?

Q For a station to -- during the period in which the copyright law was still based on -- copyright law definition of local carriage was still based on the old must-carry rules, a broadcast station that wanted to be carried by a cable operator within its local television market, the ADI, might be required if it were actually a distant signal in that local market to reimburse the cable operator for any additional copyright royalties that the cable operator would have to pay because, even though it was a local signal for FCC purposes, it was still a distant signal under the copyright rules.

A Okay.

Q And it would have had to have reimbursed 100 percent of the copyright royalties incurred by the cable operator, even though they only received at that point 5.75 percent of those royalties back for the value of their own programs. I am going to ask you to assume that that is the --

A What is the -- I am sorry. What is the

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- 1 5.7 percent?
 - 0 That was the most recent CRT decision.
- 3 Oh, I see.
- 4 Q And NAB hired us to go. We actually got 5 more money for them the next time around. As of 1993,

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- 7 A Right.
- Q -- that was the state of play. 8
- A Okay. 9
- 10 Q Okay? Now, would it make sense to you 11 that if the broadcast industry's principal focus was 12 on getting carriage within the local television market in which its ratings were purported and it sold 13 advertising and it were required to reimburse 14 15 copyright royalties, would want to have all of the stations carried by the system on the basic tier and 16
 - Well, what you are saying is that there is an offset here. To the extent that they get coverage, then -- and they get carriage, then the reduction in the basic rate that affects the copyright royalty is offset by the benefits of that carriage. I take it

1 that the broadcasters are different. They're unique 2 in this respect because they have an interest in 3 getting carriage in order to get advertising revenues 4 back.

The suggestion that you have made here with regard to the JSC exhibit 2 only relates to a broadcaster's interest to get carriage within its local market where it sells its advertising, correct?

Well, I'm not sure that they would only be concerned about just that local market. If they're able to get further carriage outside of that market, then they can begin to garner advertising revenues outside of their local market. I would think that would be in their interest as well. And they probably have that in mind.

Q If you accept as a proposition that I am going to represent in the evidence of this proceeding that there isn't additional advertising revenue to be gained by commercial broadcast stations outside their local market, putting WGN to one side, then the suggestion you just made is not applicable, correct?

MR. GARRETT: I will object to the

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that is what you are leading me to.

have a low price for the basic tier?

- That concern with the offsetting benefit would be carriage in the local market of the television station, correct?
 - Α Yes.
- So this particular fact, given the context of what was happening in January of 1993, what the state of play was, does not provide evidence of a willingness by a commercial broadcast station to accept less than the value of their programs in a different market? That is, when they went out to be carried as a distant signal, this doesn't provide any evidence that suggests that they would be willing to accept less for their programs, does it?
- Your one example may not, but in general, what this refers to is the fact that the broadcasters are willing to take lower 5.7 or whatever it is percent shares of copyright royalty revenues because they get carriage and they are able to increase their total advertising revenues. That's the deduction that comes from this.

And what I am saying in this testimony is

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characterization on the record. I don't agree with that at all as to whether --

JUDGE von KANN: Let's take it as a hypo, then. Then we'll figure out later what the record shows.

THE WITNESS: Well, there is another issue. And that is, of course, even if it's just the carriage of the local signals, the fact of getting carriage on cable improves the signal quality for many stations.

And they may have desire, but the broadcasters may be willing to sacrifice some copyright royalties in order to get better signal quality on the cable system.

BY MR. STEWART:

- Q Better signal quality
- 17 Uh-huh. Α
- 18 Q What do you mean by that?
 - Well, the -- having cable carry your signal improves the quality, particularly for -- and has over time. I don't know if it's still true, but certainly back in that period of time, I would think

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- 1 it would be true, say UHF stations, low-powered UHF 2 stations, for instance.
- 3 Q Locally?
- 4 A Yes.

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- 5 O In the local market?
 - Yes. I mean, the cable -- sure, sure.
- 7 0 Yes. I don't want to look only at the
- 8 distant signal --
 - Right. Α
- 10 -- carriage situation. So that is not applicable in that situation, is it? 11
- 12 Well, but the fact that the broadcasters 13 are in this case lobbying for lower cable rates must 14 suggest either that they think they can get some 15 benefit from lower rates and, therefore, greater cable 16 subscriptions for the basic tier or that they're just 17 simply trying to penalize the cable systems by
 - Now, is it the case in your view that rate regulation itself reduced the copyright royalty fund?

reducing their revenue flows because it certainly does

I haven't reached a -- I haven't actually

reduce the copyright royalty revenues.

1 equipment rentals."

- I remember that.
- You do remember that?
- Α Yes.

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So that suggests that there could be a 0 business strategy for a cable operator that would include a relatively low-priced basic tier which would expand subscribership for the purpose of increasing overall revenues. Is that right?

The passage in this book that you referred to is an attempt by myself and Harold Furchtgott-Roth, who subsequently became an FCC commissioner, to explain why it is that we found that the price elasticity of demand for basic cable was less than unity in absolute value, meaning that were they to raise price, they would get greater revenues.

No firm of market power operates presumably in a range of inelastic demand. And our deduction was that the reason they may do this is to get their service into more homes so as to be able to sell them enhanced tiers, pay-per-view, premium services, and so forth.

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- done an empirical analysis of it. It strikes me that it would be hard to conclude that a reduction of this magnitude wouldn't do so. It would be offset by sufficient increase in cable subscription to offset the reduction, the effective reduction, in price.
- Q And I think that there has been testimony about the reduction in the royalty fund resulting from rate regulation for the first couple of years, '93 and '94, when rate regulation first went into effect. Are you aware of that testimony?
 - I am not aware of that testimony.
- In your book, you talk about -- are you familiar with the phenomenon of tiering?
- 14 Do you mean on cable systems? A
- 15 0 Yes.
- 16 Α Yes. Well, I'm broadly familiar, yes.
- 17 Now, in your book at page 67, you say, "A 18 cable company might sell additional subscriptions" --
- 19 and I am going to show you this so you can read the
- 20 context -- "might sell additional subscriptions to a
- 21 basic service at a loss to attract additional
 - subscribers to premium and pay-per-view services and

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- Q And you're aware, are you not, that the rate regulation adopted by the FCC, particularly as it related to the basic tier, was different from the rate regulation of higher tiers that cable operators offered?
 - Α Yes, I do.
 - Are you aware of the fact that the basic tier was required to include all broadcast stations except for superstations?
- I don't recall as we sit here that that was the requirement, but if you --
- Q I can show you, but let's just proceed on that premise. I would like to hand you copies of two of the exhibits that were presented by Dr. Ducey in this proceeding in his direct case, which are his exhibits 1 and 3.
- Dr. Crandall, have you seen these exhibits Q before?
- 19 Α No. I have not.
 - Well, the exhibit 1 just charts the path of the royalty funds, the cable copyright royalty funds, over the years. And the second chart, exhibit

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number 3, charts the instances of carriage; that is, the number of cable systems that carried various categories of stations over time. The one thing I want to point out to you is that the intervening years, '93 to '98, are compressed a bit so that the slopes are different on the lines. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Now, you can see in exhibit 1 that between '93 and '94, the middle of '94, when the statute was passed, the rate regulation was adopted, the rate rollbacks occurred, that there was a decline in the overall compulsory license royalties. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q But then it starts to move upward. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Now, if you look over exhibit 3, you see that, first of all, in the period 1990 to 1993, the carriage of superstations in terms of carriage incidence far outstrips those of the other program types there. Do you see that?

A -- rises between '94 and -- I don't know -- '96 and a half, '94 and a half and '96 and a half, I guess. Now, over on the other exhibit, we are talking about total cable compulsory license royalties, which are based upon the basis cable rates.

Q They're based on the rates of all tiers that have any television in them, both basic and if you have a superstation in an expanded basic tier, that --

A Oh, I see. Okay.

Q Okay?

A Now, what I don't know is how many of these superstations are put in the upper tiers, which weren't unregulated. I mean, they were just regulated differently.

Q Right.

A And how many are on the basic tier?

Q Right. We don't know that.

A Right.

Q In particular, the difference in the trend of carriage of superstations in those intervening years, mid '94 to mid '97, compared with carriage

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A Yes.

Q And in the middle of '94, after a bit of a decline from '93, you see an upward trend in the carriage of superstations. Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Now, if it were the case that the tiers that included superstations were subject to less stripped rate regulation and the cable operators were pursuing their profit-maximizing scheme of raising prices to the extent possible on upper tiers and including superstations in those tiers to extract subscribers, this picture would show that the cable operators, cable industry had figured out a way to get back on an increasing trend for their gross receipts by adding superstations to their higher tiers above the basic tier, right? Would that be consistent with

A How do you reach that deduction? The number of superstations and instances of carriage, as you called it, because this is not weighted by size of cable system but --

Q Right.

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instances of the other types, would be consistent with
a phenomenon in which cable operators are now adding
superstations and maximizing the price of their
expanded basic tiers, which has the effect of also
increasing the cable compulsory license royalty fund?

A It's possible, but it would be nice if we had some numbers on what was going on with average rates. And also one of the things that the panel should be aware of is that in this period in the -- I don't know exactly when it began.

In the mid to late 1990s, rate regulation fell apart. I mean, essentially the FCC threw up its hands, allowed MSOs to just claim they were complying when they weren't really complying. In effect, rate regulation became a nightmare and really was not much of an effect.

Q What period was that?

A I don't know when that starts. It starts after -- just as we were publishing this book and shortly thereafter. I would guess '96, somewhere in there, '95-'96. It didn't work very well.

Q You would expect if that were the

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principal driving factor to see if, then, a continuing increase in the compulsory license royalty fund through '96 and beyond, would you not?

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Q WGN also has a dip in that period. Is 2 that right?

A Yes. I don't know what was happening to

A What you see on both of your charts is a substantial drop-off in superstation carriage. And, of course, we had a lot of discussion in this room I'm sure about one major reason for that. And that is WTBS.

But also there are lots of things going on in the programming market. The number of basic cable networks is expanding like topsy over this period. And the alternatives available to cable systems are expanding substantially.

Q Now, going back to the FCC proceedings to implement the Cable Act, other groups represented in this room also participated in those proceedings, did they not?

A I'm sure they did, yes.

Q Are you familiar with positions taken by the sports claimants in those proceedings?

A Not specifically, no.

Q I want to show you --

A Yes. I don't know what was happening to the baseball teams at that time. I wouldn't put a substantial weight on that, yes.

Q Good for you, Dr. Crandall.

A Maybe you're not as much of a sports fan as I.

Q I would like to hand you what I have marked as NAB exhibit 55-RX, a document that we got from the FCC's records in this same docket that JSC exhibit 2 comes from. As you can see, this was filed by the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball on May 16th, 1994. Do you see that?

A I do.

(Whereupon, the aforementioned document was marked for identification as NAB Exhibit Number 55-RX.)

BY MR. STEWART:

Q There is a bit of a discussion of this on page 2, but to set this in context, the FCC had

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JUDGE von KANN: Dr. Crandall, while we are getting at that, recognizing this isn't your chart, do you have any particular explanation on the NAB exhibit 3 for this pretty dramatic drop-off in the superstations incidence prior to 1998, which I'm told is when WTBS ceased being a superstation, that that wasn't the case in '96 or '7? So something else is going on there besides that.

THE WITNESS: My hypothesis would be that the development of more and more basic cable networks available by satellite was becoming an increasing source of competition for the superstations, but I haven't looked at that carefully.

JUDGE von KANN: Okay.

BY MR. STEWART:

Q I just want to just hand you a copy of NAB exhibit 4, which breaks down the superstation carriage into individual stations. Do you see that in this '96-'97 period, WWOR drops from its level of, say, 500 Form 3 systems to close to zero?

A I don't know about zero but maybe 50 or something or 100, yeah.

proposed as part of its rate adjustment provisions one in which it said that, just roughly speaking, if you add a channel to your cable services, you can increase your rate to recover programming expenses associated with an added channel of some 7.5 percent market. Are you familiar with that aspect of this?

A I remember that, not the details. But I remember that aspect of their rules.

Q Here on the first page, where baseball is asking for -- it's actually not clear exactly what. It looks like they're putting down their marker, saying, "We want to make sure that we're involved in whatever reconsideration of this happens."

MR. GARRETT: Is there a question there? BY MR. STEWART:

Q If you look at the bottom of the first page, you see where the statement is made, "Baseball has a strong interest in ensuring that its programming reaches the largest number of viewers possible"?

20 A Yes.

Q Now, is that strong interest one that you would take into account in determining whether

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baseball would accept less than the full value of its programming in order to achieve that strong interest?

A I don't believe that baseball would be able to obtain advertising revenues directly, but nowhere in here do I see an assertion. Maybe there was an assertion made somewhere else that the Major League Baseball wanted lower basic cable rates.

O I don't think that is what this is about.

A It sounds to me as if maybe they want actually greater incentive to add channels for the cable systems and maybe higher rates, but I'm not sure what they're asking for.

Q Do you see there at the top of page 2 they talk about their concern that cable operators would be unwilling to add the baseball cable casts to the basic tier of service?

A Yes.

Q Instead, the cable operators might offer baseball cable casts as an a la carte offering; that is, just to the people who want to pay extra for it? Is that right?

22 A Yes.

sports networks as part of a basic tier of service, rather than charging just the cable subscribers who want to receive the sports programming?

MR. GARRETT: I am sorry. Did that question ask about the sports interests or about the regional sports networks?

MR. STEWART: Sports interests.

THE WITNESS: Will you ask the question one more time. I'm sorry.

BY MR. STEWART:

Q Do you know whether there is an issue that continues today about whether regional cable sports networks should be carried by cable operators as a part of their basic service available to all subscribers or only on an a la carte basis?

A I don't know of that issue today.

Q Do you know anything about the Yes Network in --

A I've read some things about it, but, unfortunately, I'm - that's only something I pass by in the Wall Street Journal occasionally.

Q Let me get back to this. It strikes me

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Q Are you familiar with that phenomenon in general?

A I remember back when I was -- now we are talking about ten years ago -- that there was a possibility under the rules of a la carte offerings. It strikes me that what has happened since that time is that they have gone to tiers with much less reliance on a la carte, but I think a la carte was something that developed principally because of regulation.

Q Do you know whether baseball interests have continued to work to make sure that these -- let me drop back. Do you know whether these discussions here of baseball telecasts, cablecasts, are a reference to regional sports networks on which baseball games are cablecast?

A They could be. I don't remember at this time, which is nine years ago, how pervasive regional sports networks were.

Q Are you familiar with the phenomenon that baseball interests have continued to attempt to make sure that cable operators carried their regional

that perhaps what baseball is saying here at this time is that if you regulate the basic tier at very low rates, then you induce the cable operators to move away from putting things on basic service, like baseball, and putting it on other tiers.

And at that time, it may be that the demand for those a la carte, whether they were regional networks or whatever they were, was a lot lower than it is today. At some point, as income grows, as the taste for sports increases and becomes more pervasive, it may well be that that trade-off changes.

So this is 1994. You just asked me a question about 2003. The royalties changed since then, I would think.

Q What economic interest would baseball have in preferring carriage on a basic cable service, as opposed to on an a la carte service?

A I would think they would want as broad carriage as they can get. And to the extent that -- and I guess they would have to make a judgment whether they can make -- whether they can get more money from

Page 10199 Page 10197 1 a regional sports network than they can from the 1 starting at page 3, where the comments begin. You can 2 2 see there and over onto the top of page 4 comments enhanced revenues from an a la carte -- excuse me --3 an expansion of the basic service through 3 that have to do with this copyright royalty 4 advertising-supported broadcasting and --4 indemnification issue that we discussed earlier. 5 5 Are you familiar with or do you know why Uh-huh. 6 there would be a concern about the adequacy of a rate 6 0 Under paragraph 2 at the bottom of page 4, 7 7 adjustment rule that allows you to increase your there is a discussion about requests to add 8 communities to or delete communities from a television 8 subscriber rates by the full amount of programming 9 expenses plus seven and a half percent, why baseball 9 market. Do you see that? 10 10 would have thought that would be inadequate to induce Α On page --11 cable operators to put the channel on their basic 11 On page 4. It runs over to pages 5 and 6. 12 service? 12 Are you familiar with what that issue was in the 13 implementation of the 1992 Act? 13 A Let me read this just briefly. (Perusing 14 document.) I don't recall exactly how this worked 14 I don't recall now, no. 15 15 out, but I do remember that there was considerable I am going to just represent to you that 16 concern that these regulations would slow the growth 16 there was a provision. First of all, the must-carry 17 of basic cable networks. And I believe even Dr. 17 rights and the retransmission consent rights in the 18 18 local market were tied to the television market Hazlett documented that in one of his books. 19 MR. STEWART: I would move exhibit 55-RX 19 through ADI. Okay? 20 for impeachment purposes. 20 Α Yes. 21 JUDGE von KANN: Any objection? 21 O That was the default. There was a 22 22 MR. GARRETT: No objection. provision for special circumstances in which a station Page 10198 Page 10200 JUDGE von KANN: All right. So received. or cable operator could petition the FCC and say, "No. 1 1 (Whereupon, the aforementioned 2 For must-carry purposes, this community ought to be 2 3 3 document, having previously considered part of that market or that market." Okay? 4 been marked for identification 4 Does that sound familiar to you? 5 as NAB Exhibit Number 55-RX. 5 A I don't recall any of those provisions. 6 6 I think we never got into it in our study of cable was received in evidence.) 7 7 MR. STEWART: I would next like to hand regulations. 8 you a document I would like to have marked as exhibit 8 Q In this comment, Mr. Hochberg or the NHL 9 56-RX. 9 and the NBA are addressing the question who should 10 10 (Whereupon, the aforementioned have the right to petition the FCC to change the 11 document was marked for 11 definition of the local market under the rules 12 identification as NAB Exhibit 12 implementing the '92 Cable Act. Okay? And at the 13 13 Number 56-RX.) bottom of page 5, there is a paragraph that begins 14 BY MR. STEWART: 14 "Finally." Do you see that? 15 Q Dr. Crandall, this is a copy again from 15 Α Yes. the FCC's files of comments filed by our dear friend 16 16 Would you read that to yourself and then 17 17 Phil Hochberg on behalf of the National Basketball just let me know what you understand that to be 18 Association and National Hockey League in FCC 18 saying? 19 proceeding docket number 92-259, which was another 19 A (Perusing document.) I've read it. 20 part of the implementation of the 1992 Cable Act. 20 What do you understand it to be saying? 0 21 I see that, yes. 21 What I understand them to be saying is 22 Okay. I would like you to turn to 22 that the ADI dimensions of a market don't necessarily Q

Page 10201 Page 10203 1 correspond to the markets that sports franchises 1 Α Yeah. 2 2 perceive geographically and, therefore, that these two 0 And do you know whether the FCC adopted 3 leagues would like the right at least to request under 3 that position? 4 this process that these communities be added or 4 Α No, I do not. 5 deleted; i.e., that the definition of what constitutes 5 MR. STEWART: I would move 56-RX for 6 a local market for these purposes be changed by 6 impeachment purposes. 7 7 regulation to better confirm to the geographical MR. GARRETT: No objection. 8 dimensions of sports markets. 8 JUDGE von KANN: So received. 9 Q In the particular example he uses about 9 (Whereupon, the aforementioned 10 New Jersey, do you see that? 10 document, having previously 11 Α Yes. 11 been marked for identification 12 12 Q What are you saying? Is this a fair as NAB Exhibit Number 56-RX, characterization? The NBA and the NHL wanted to have 13 13 was received in evidence.) 14 the ability to ask the FCC, in effect, to extend the 14 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honor, with that, 15 15 must-carry rights of Philadelphia stations so that I have no further questions for Dr. Crandall. 16 they could be carried by cable operators in New 16 JUDGE von KANN: Okay. Thank you. 17 Jersey. Is that right? 17 Okay. I think Mr. Hester indicated he 18 18 Well, at least -- yes. Somehow I judge would have some questions. 19 that would be one of the possibilities because the 19 MR. HESTER: Yes, sir. Good afternoon, 20 conclusion is so they can target New Jersey 20 Dr. Crandall. 21 communities, so that a Philadelphia franchise can 21 THE WITNESS: It is afternoon. Good 22 22 target New Jersey communities. So I judge that's what afternoon. Page 10204 Page 10202 1 MR. HESTER: Yes. We have made it. I am 1 they have in mind. 2 2 So, even though the Philadelphia stations Tim Hester, representing the Public Television 3 3 could be carried by those New Jersey cable systems as Claimants. 4 4 THE WITNESS: I remember. How do you do? distant signals, the NBA and the NHL were asking for 5 the right to acquire those cable systems to carry the 5 CROSS-EXAMINATION б 6 BY MR. HESTER: Philadelphia stations under the must-carry rules. Is 7 7 that fair? Q I wanted to ask you to turn to page 1 of 8 8 A That may be -- that's a reasonable your testimony, please. 9 9 deduction. I don't know if that conforms to the facts Α Okay. 10 at the time for just this paragraph. 10 And I wanted to ask you, in particular, to At the very end of this set of comments, 11 focus on the discussion in paragraph 5, if you could. 11 12 starting on page 13, the NBA and the NHL argue that 12 Here in the first sentence, you refer to the mix of 13 13 programming purchased in the unregulated market. And the retransmission consent rules ought to allow them, 14 14 you compare that or distinguish that against the mix the leagues, to negotiate to control the stations' 15 exercise of retransmission consent rights with respect 15 purchased in the regulated market. Do you see that? 16 16 to cable carriage. Do you see that? A Yes. 17 17 In your view, are you making the point A You say to control. They say to maintain 18 some control. 18 here that the mix of programming purchased in the 19 Okay. Right. To negotiate with 19 unregulated market; in other words, the hypothetical 20 broadcasters to affect or influence the exercise by 20 market, would not necessarily be the same mix of 21 the broadcasters of their retransmission consent 21 programming as is purchased in the actual market? 22 rights? 22 That's the point. The -- after these

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1 negotiations take place, it may lead to -- assuming, 2 by the way, that we are still talking about only 3 imported distant signals and that's the mechanism by 4 getting -- for getting the programming to the cable 5 supplier, it could well be that the prices, all of the 6 prices, that emerge from this lead to a shift in the 7 program mix on that imported distant signal.

And so the point you are making here is that in the second sentence now, you say that it would be difficult to know exactly what that hypothetical program mix might be?

A Of course, yes.

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Because it's complicated to estimate what Q all of the outcomes would be of that unregulated marketplace?

A Yes. I would need to know what the prices would look like and how the cable -- excuse me -- how the broadcasters carrying those signals would respond to that marketplace. It would be very difficult to do without -- you would need some sort of experiment or some empirical evidence where it has been tried as an analog.

this exercise. I mean, as an economist, it strikes me if you're looking for value and to allocate in terms of value, you need to know how the participants would behave in an unregulated marketplace.

Q So you begin with the premise that the panel's goal in undertaking to estimate fair market value is to think of a hypothetical unregulated market?

A Yes.

Q And then the point you make at the bottom of this first page is that the Bortz survey in your view strikes a balance between the actual choices in the regulated market. That's what the Bortz survey is looking at?

The Bortz survey is looking at how cable systems value the programming they now carry. And, therefore, this does provide an exercise of asking how that mix of programming would change if we had an unregulated marketplace.

So you're looking at what was actually carried as a proxy of trying to come up with the values in a market where the mix of programming might

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O And then in the next sentence, the third sentence, in paragraph 5, you say, "So, instead, the panel should look at the value of the programming purchased"?

Α Yes.

But the point you're making there is that the value of the programming actually purchased is meant to be a proxy or a means to getting toward a different mix of programming that might be purchased in the hypothetical market?

A I think what I am saying is that I doubt that the panel could make any judgments about how the mix would change and, therefore, that this is largely an exercise overcompensating those people who are supplying the current programs and their current program mix.

Q But the point you're making, I take it, at the start of this paragraph 5 is that in the unregulated market, which is, I take it, the marketplace that you think the panel should be trying to replicate, is that right?

That's my understanding of the history of

Page 10208

be different?

A Well, as a proxy -- well, I'm not sure that that is quite correct. It strikes me that the exercise this panel is engaged in is how a marketplace would price -- would value these various programs that are actually distributed.

I mean, take the -- we know that when we deregulate markets, markets change rather dramatically. I mean, assume that one of these categories of programming would completely disappear and three or four new ones would appear.

The panel, it seems to me, would be in a very difficult position to try to make such judgments and provide an allocation of copyright royalties to programming that today isn't even produced, doesn't even exist.

And it seems a more -- that the more modest understanding of their role is to determine how to divide the copyright royalty pool based upon the value of that programming to cable operators, given its current mix.

But I take it in paragraph 5, one of the

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points you're making is that you couldn't simply look entirely at the actual programming choices actually made to know what would happen in the hypothetical free market?

A If the goal of this panel was to determine what would happen in a totally unregulated market; that is, one without compulsory copyright licenses, then it is certainly possible, as I say, that the mix of programming would change.

Q Okay. Mix of programming would change from what was actually purchased in these years?

A Yes, it could change, but what I said previously was that it seems to me that this is an exercise that is not worth doing that cannot be easily done and that the exercise, as I understand it, is more to figure out what the programs that are actually distributed are worth to the participants and to the cable operators.

Q But if you merely looked at what was actually distributed without trying to take account of the hypothetical market, you're actually not estimating the fair market values, are you?

A No. I think the actual choices remain constant, but the amount paid for it -- the question is, how much does a cable operator -- how much value does he place on what he actually carries?

As I understand the Bortz survey, it is to ask him -- remind him what he now carries on imported distant signals and to ask him what the value of that would be. How much of his budget would he allocate for that programming?

Q And you include, again, as we have discussed, in your contemplation of this hypothetical market the prospect of a change in programming mix as part of what the market could produce?

A I think that's less likely. I think it's more likely what happens is there is a change in relative prices, but not so much a change in the mix. I think the entire approach of the Bortz survey is to focus on what this cable operator now takes and how much of his budget he would allocate for various components of it.

Q Well, I am referring back, I guess, to the first line of paragraph 5, where you talk about the

Page 10212

A Well, the fair market value of what was

distributed. I mean, I assume that what is going on here is that we're compensating the copyright owners for the programs that were actually exhibited, not compensating them for what might have been.

We might have live opera from La Scala every night, but I am not sure that La Scala is represented in this room and should be represented.

Q Well, we're trying. Let me ask you to look at the top of page 2. When at the very first line here, you refer to the hypothetical nature of a free market, that's the one where a marketplace value would be derived. Is that what you mean by that, "hypothetical nature of a free market"?

A Yes. And then I put in parens "by asking a cable operator how it would allocate its budget" across program categories if such a choice were possible.

Q Right. And you distinguish that hypothetical nature of a free market from what you refer to at the bottom of page 1, which is the actual choice in a regulated market, right?

mix of programming purchased being different. That's where you refer to a change in the program mix as one consequence of the unregulated market?

A As I say, it is possible that the mix purchase would differ, but then later on, two sentences later, I say, "Rather, the panel should assess the value of the programming actually purchased."

Q Because you are saying that's the one that you can readily do?

A I believe, yes, as a practical matter, it's easier to do. I am not going to comment upon a legal matter of whether this panel could allocate copyright royalties to programming not now carried.

Q Let me ask you to turn over to page 7, paragraph 17.

A Yes

Q The third or fourth sentence down, you say, "The Bortz survey directly reproduces the hypothetical market conditions supposed by the panel by using experimental spending patterns." Do you see that?

Page 10214

Page 10215

1 A Yes.

Q When you say "the hypothetical market conditions supposed by the panel," what are you referring to there?

A Well, a market in which the cable operator is free to decide how much you would be willing to spend on the various categories of programming he actually now takes.

Q So it's a market in which the compulsory license doesn't exist?

A Well, presumably it's an alternative to the compulsory license, but, as I said earlier, it's probably the practical solution to it is undoubtedly to focus on the programming actually carried and not to vary the programmings.

Q But the hypothetical market you are talking about is one where there is no compulsory license?

A Yes.

Q When you refer to experimental spending patterns, you are really talking there about -- well, maybe I should ask you. What do you mean when you

you make about PBS applies just as readily to an independent signal that is carried at one DSE, rather than a 3.75 rate. The issue you're raising, this simple example, could just as easily be applied to any other signal. Right?

A It could be applied to any other combination of signals. On -- the point you raise is that if a cable operator carries precisely one DSE, he has no incremental cost. The point that was raised in the paragraph that rolls over from page 8 to 9, paragraph 19 is that when you combine a 3.75 signal with a PBS signal, you get a batch of minutes on the commercial signal, on the PBS signal, but you get a total royalty responsibility, which has attributed to the whole package. And, of course, part of the problem is trying to separate out those two.

Q Right. And the same point would apply about the total package of royalties paid in being applied to a batch of minutes. The same point would apply if you had an independent signal combined with a 3.75 signal. You would have the same issue?

A Yes.

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mean when you say "experimental spending patterns"?

A Well, in a sense, it isn't asking the cable operator to undertake a thought experiment because at the present time, all he knows is he pays such and such a share of his basic cable revenues for a particular program or a particular set of programs that he imports as distant signals.

He doesn't have to pay for the individual components. The programming was in those signals directly. Now, the Bortz survey asks him to go through a thought experiment. How much would you be willing -- how much do you value each of these programming types that are in these imported distant signals? So by that, I mean that it's an experimental approach.

Q Okay. Let me ask you to turn to pages 8 and 9, maybe 9. I wanted to go back briefly to this discussion you had with Mr. Stewart on the issue of the treatment of the 3.75 signals in the Rosston study and, in particular, this point you make about the treatment of PBS.

I take it, first of all, that this point

Q Okay. And you recognize that there was a dummy variable included in the Rosston analysis to take account of this?

A Yes, it was, but, as I answered --

O Now --

MR. GARRETT: Let him finish his answer.
MR. HESTER: Well, I think that was a
"Yes" or "No."

MR. GARRETT: I don't think it was a "Yes" or "No." I think he is entitled to explain his answer.

THE WITNESS: I don't believe that the specification would capture that accurately enough. As I mentioned earlier, I think the entire specification is putting royalty revenues on the left-hand side and aggregates of minutes on the right-hand side. It's not an appropriate way to do this. But just putting a dummy variable suggests that the effect of the 3.75 is independent of the size of the system.

MR. HESTER: I was just getting a ruling

MR. HESTER: I was just getting a ruling on this. We will go through it.

Page 10217 Page 10219 1 MR. GARRETT: Okay. Sure. 1 trying to control for in the dummy variable, right? 2 2 BY MR. HESTER: That is correct. 3 3 And so in this circumstance, Mr. Rosston Q I wanted to ask you, how does a dummy Q 4 variable work? 4 included a dummy variable that was intended to pull 5 5 A A dummy variable picks up the effect of out. I recognize you have a point. You are not 6 whether something is in place or not. б comfortable with whether it worked. But the intent 7 7 Q Right. was to pull out the impact of the 3.75 Fund by 8 8 In this case, 3.75 is in place, but the whenever you had a 3.75 Fund for a particular system, 9 issue is, how does that interact with the rest of the 9 it got a one and if a 3.75 Fund wasn't part of the 10 10 variables in the system? mix, it got a zero. Right? 11 That's what he intended to do. 11 Q Well, let me abstract away from the 12 12 Right. And do you know, in fact, that the particular Rosston study. I wanted to ask you a 13 13 broader question about regression analysis and coefficient for that 3.75 Fund dummy variable ended up 14 technique. First of all, dummy variables are used all 14 to be a quite large number? 15 15 A Yes. It was inevitable given the rate the time in regression analyses, right? 16 structure. 3.75 is a large multiple of the rest of 16 A Yes. 17 17 0 And the way they are done as a matter of the rates in the system. 18 18 methodology is if you have a particular proposition or Right. And it was also highly 19 19 statistically significant, right? issue you are concerned about, you give the dummy 20 variable a value of either one or zero, right? 20 Α Yes, it was. 21 That is usually the definition of a dummy 21 This is not anything unusual in regression 22 22 variable. analyses. There are many occasions when you would see Page 10218 Page 10220 1 1 O Right. some particular point in your data set that you think 2 2 might skew the results. And so you throw in a dummy It takes on two values: one or zero. 3 3 Q It's a one or a zero. And so if you have variable to take account of that to avoid the skewing 4 a certain event or observation or whatever it is you 4 effect. 5 are trying to control for, you give the dummy variable 5 Α Well, I am glad you used the term "throw 6 a one in that circumstance. And otherwise you give it 6 in" because in a sense, that is what happened here. 7 7 a zero. Right? I think that thrown in without thinking about how the 8 Α Yes. 8 3.75 rate affects royalties. 9 Q So if you are trying to estimate IQ as a 9 And it should be multiplicative with, for function of income and you are trying to control for 10 10 instance, the size of the cable system. I mean, to 11 some other factor that you think might have some 11 have it sit out here by itself says that a cable 12 spurious effect, you might throw a dummy variable into 12 system with 1,000 subscribers, it has the same effect 13 that equation. And you would give it a one or a zero, 13 in terms of total royalty revenues as a cable system 14 right? 14

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A I think a dummy variable for IQ is an interesting concept, but yes, I understand what you are saying.

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I'd better work on my examples. But then you look at the size of the coefficient estimated for the dummy variable and the statistical significance of the coefficient in assessing whether you have been able to pull out the impact of whatever it is you are

out here with a million subscribers.

And I think that is just a very problematic -- I mean, a significant specification error in the entire equation.

Well, a cable system with 1,000 subscribers presumably isn't going to have a 3.75 signal, right?

Well, but you take my point. That is, I would be willing to bet if we look at those systems

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that are taking 3.75 signals, they're not all of the same size and the impact is multiplicative, not additive.

Q But the point I am trying to work through with you is that in terms of whether there is some particular skewing as to public television from this, the dummy variable is intended in the specification to pull that out?

A I believe -- and I know Dr. Rosston well, and he's a good economist. I believe that was his intention. I don't think he explained it very well, but I think that clearly was his intention.

Q Let me ask you to turn to page 11, please.

JUDGE GULIN: Before we leave this -- are you leaving this point? I just wanted to get some idea if you can tell me of the magnitude of this bias that you think exists. Do you understand what the 3.75 percent adjustment that was made to Rosston entails, the adjustment for the 3.75? And you say basically, I think, that you would just not make the adjustment because you think that the bias that you speak of washes that. And that's what I am trying to

to try to guess at it would be just I think wholly inappropriate.

BY MR. HESTER:

Q Well, I take it you would agree with me that the dummy variable correction part for the 3.75 effect, you just think it doesn't go far enough?

A Well, it creates a specification problem. I don't know about -- it certainly adjusts for the 3.75 in some way. It doesn't do it correctly. The -- probably your statement is correct. It doesn't go far enough. But I am always cautious about making predictions as to how it would work out in the absence of it.

Q But this --

JUDGE GULIN: If you agree with that, then I guess your statement that you would not give PTV the so-called 3.75 adjustment, I guess did you want to back off of that a little bit and --

THE WITNESS: No, no. I didn't disagree.
I agree that there is some adjustment because the 3.75 variable is in there. But I also agreed to Mr.
Hester's question that it doesn't -- probably doesn't

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get a sense of. You are saying that the bias rises to that extent?

THE WITNESS: No. I am saying -- what I am saying is it isn't that they would not have something in there. Assuming that I were to go down this road of running this regression to start with, I wouldn't have it as an additive variable, but I would have it multiplicative times the size of the cable system or something like that because the effect of the 3.75 is multiplicative with the size of the cable system.

It isn't just something you add on. You don't just add on a payment because you're 3.75. It multiples by the basic cable revenues.

JUDGE GULIN: I am just trying to get a sense of the magnitude of the bias as it was performed by Dr. Rosston. Is there any way you can give me a sense of that?

THE WITNESS: Well, there would be a way to do it, I suppose, and that is to estimate that in a fashion which I just suggested. I haven't done that. So I can't give you anything precise. For me

do enough and that it undoubtedly -- undoubtedly remaining in there is an upward bias on the PTV share because of this commingling effect and the failure to take account properly of the 3.75.

JUDGE GULIN: In paragraph 20, you say,
"In question 8, the panel asks whether it would be
necessary to give PTV a larger share of the Basic Fund
than shown in Dr. Rosston's table in order for PTV to
receive the share of the total royalty pool." In
light of the PBS bias in the model, essentially giving
PBS credit for 3.75 Fund payments, no such adjustment
should be performed?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Put it in quotes; that is, that their estimate is biased upward by the Rosston methodology.

JUDGE GULIN: If the dummy variable partly accomplishes the bias, doesn't that indicate that still some sort of adjustment would be necessary to give PTV a larger share of the Basic Fund?

THE WITNESS: How do we know that what is left doesn't double or treble the PTV share? We don't know that until we do it the right way. And, as I

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said, even the right way is probably not a very
 appropriate way to think of this problem.
 MR. HESTER: Let me walk through the

MR. HESTER: Let me walk through this again.

BY MR. HESTER:

- Q First of all, this point you're raising about your view that the dummy variable isn't sufficient, you refer to that as a specification issue. I think?
- A Yes.

- 11 Q That specification issue isn't unique to 12 public television somehow?
 - A No, it's not unique to public television.
 - Q You're talking about just the standard question of specification errors that are present in any regression analysis, questions that can be raised about whether the model adequately predicts what is purported to be predicted?
 - A But there are some which we -- we know that there is a better answer, and we should do it the right way. It is certainly true that you always have some -- the entire economic problem correctly. And I

1 the PTV coefficient, yes, from this source.

- Q You haven't checked for that, how many of those there are?
 - A I have not.
- Q The 3.75 adjustment that the panel asked about involves a different question. It involves how the Rosston results are to be applied to the Basic Fund, right?
 - A Well, I guess we had better make clear what we are talking about here. I am not sure. I believe that's correct. I am not sure.
 - Q I was just trying to distinguish because the bias you are talking about is a bias in the coefficient estimated from the Rosston study for PTV, right?
 - A Yes.
- Q The panel's question relates to whether in applying the Rosston results to the Basic Fund, there needs to be an adjustment to take account of the fact that PTV is not in the 3.75 Fund, right?
- 21 A Yes.
 - Q Okay. Those are not the same questions.

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mentioned that earlier. But, at the very least, you would want this thing to be multiplicative in the --

- Q If you had a circumstance where you have a particular set of observations in the Rosston study, where you have a 3.75 signal being carried and two independents and zero public television, right? In that circumstance, PTV ends up with a zero for that observation in terms of the way that would work in the regression, right?
- A It doesn't end up with a zero. It's just irrelevant. That is, there is no PTV there in the variable on the right-hand side. Yes, right.
- Q Because the way the study works, it takes a series of observations to estimate these coefficients, right?
 - A Yes.
- Q So you would have to have a circumstance, even to get to this theoretical circumstance that you are talking about, you would have to have both a PTV distant signal and a 3.75 signal carried by the same operator, right?
 - A In order for there to be an upward bias on

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- A Well, but one bears on the other. If, in fact, the share from the Rosston regression is -- overstates the PTV share, then there is certainly much less cause to adjust the share going to PTV for its -- the fact that it doesn't participate in the 3.75 pool.
- Q You would need to know how many of the sample observations included both a 3.75 Fund signal and a PTV distant signal in order to make the judgment you are making?
- A No. I just need to know how much is the bias in the estimating coefficient because that is what is being used here.
 - Q You haven't estimated that?
- 14 A I have not.
- Q And in terms of this impact or this biasing effect, I think you would also agree with me that the biasing effect applies across other estimating coefficients in the equation? It's not unique to PTV?
 - A Yes. I would think that it would lead to a downward bias in those sorts of program types which are important enough for cable systems that want to

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pay this very large 3.75 rate and an upward bias in
 the remainder in this low-power or Mexican or Canadian
 and so forth.

Q And those biases would occur only to the extent that the dummy variable hasn't pulled them out?

A Well, to the extent that you believe the Rosston regression is valid in the first place, yes. And then this issue goes to the specification error in the 3.75 variable.

JUDGE YOUNG: I am done with that, Judge.
Okay.

BY MR. HESTER:

- Q Let me ask you to turn to page 11.
- 14 A Uh-huh.

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- Q Paragraph 24 is where you discuss briefly
- 16 Dr. Leland Johnson's testimony for public television.
- 17 A Yes.
- Q And you have a sentence where you say that
- 19 Dr. Johnson's analysis is merely an alternative form
- of the time studies. Do you see that?
- 21 A Yes.
- Q It's the last sentence in the paragraph.

Q Well, you know he was looking at subscriber instances of carriage, maybe the same point for what you are saying?

A Yes, yes, weighted by subscribers but not by viewing. There was more time available, rather than time viewed.

Q Right. And then he was undertaking to assess after he developed those measures of relative subscriber instances of carriage. He was undertaking to assess what the relative values were of different signals, correct?

A He was attempting -- he was suggesting that instances of carriage are proportional to value and that you could somehow measure value by instances of carriage.

The fact that the same amount of carriage is available to you or me of a PTV's station and another type of signal doesn't mean to say that are of equivalent value.

Q Is your understanding that he was simply purporting to pull the assumed value out of the relative instances of carriage?

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A Yes.

Q I take it you are aware that Dr. Johnson spent a lot of time in his testimony and I will say outside of his testimony thinking about this question of whether there was parity in the value of different signals carried distantly. Do you know that?

A Well, I read both Dr. Johnson's testimony in the direct proceeding and then, of course, he also submitted something in rebuttal testimony. I am only addressing the former here, not the latter, in this testimony. But I am aware that he did talk a lot about parity, yes.

Q So he was undertaking to assess the relative value of different signals carried, correct?

A Well, he was trying to find a proxy for value, but I don't believe it reflects value.

Q He was not merely looking at time to discern relative value?

A Well, in a sense, he was because he was using instances of carriage in his original testimony. And that's proportional to the amount of time that is occupied on the importing cable system.

- A Well, he was relating it to the award in the '90-'92 proceeding.
 - Q And that was based on relative values?
- A And he was claiming that movements in instances, relative instances, of carriage of commercial and noncommercial stations would reflect relative changes in value. And I don't think there is any theoretical relationship necessarily between the two.
- Q You know, he started. He had an anchor based on the '90 to '92 CARP award?
 - A Yes. That's what I said.
- Q And that was based on the relative marketplace valuations that the CARP made in that proceeding?
 - A Yes.
 - Q And then he applied that relative marketplace valuation to the instances of carriage data?
- A Yes, thereby assuming that changes in instances of carriage are a reflection of changes in relative value. And that's where I have difficulty.

Page 10233 Page 10235 1 And that's where in my testimony I claim that there is 1 research survey is a research tool, right? 2 2 no relationship necessarily. A A research tool? What do you mean by "a 3 Okay. That's the point. 3 research tool"? 4 Α Yes. 4 Q Well, the panel question that you address 5 Q I wanted to understand. That is the point at page 1 of your testimony is whether the Bortz 5 6 you are making? 6 survey provides an accurate measurement of the 7 decisions that buyers would make in a free market? 7 A Precisely. 8 8 MR. HESTER: All right. Those are all the Α Yes. 9 questions I have. Thank you, Dr. Crandall. 9 Q Isn't it more accurate to say that the 10 10 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Bortz survey is an approximation of how the cable 11 JUDGE von KANN: Any other party have any 11 operators would like to spend their money if they had 12 12 a free market? cross-examination? Ms. Witschel? 13 13 MS. WITSCHEL: I have a very few minutes. A It's an estimate of what they believe they 14 JUDGE von KANN: How about five minutes? 14 would spend if they had the option to bury their 15 15 budget across these program categories given what they Good. Why don't you do it? Come on up. 16 are currently importing on distant signals. 16 MR. STEWART: Your Honor, I am sorry to 17 raise this belatedly, but my two exhibits 55-RX and 17 So if you want to call that a research 18 18 56-RX I intended to offer on the same basis that Mr. tool, it is an approach to trying to find out what the 19 Garrett yesterday offered some public filings. And it 19 relative values are from a major player in this entire 20 wasn't clear to me how that came out through official 20 proceeding, namely the cable operator who is paying 21 notice as to the fact that these are on file, making 21 for this stuff. 22 22 the statements that they made. And they need to be 0 The point of my question is, is that an Page 10234 Page 10236 1 estimate or an approximation, rather than some finely 1 moved. 2 So either I would ask for clarification or 2 tuned measurement? 3 3 I would --Well, I think in my direct testimony 4 JUDGE von KANN: I think they were offered 4 earlier in this proceeding, I pointed out that most 5 and received "for impeachment." If what you wish is 5 numbers we use as direct evidence of something going 6 that the record reflects that these documents were, in 6 on in the world have a measurement error as well. 7 7 fact, filed by the authoring parties in their This obviously is an estimate that a cable 8 statements of position by them, I assume that's not 8 operator makes knowing what knows. But he has the 9 objected to, not for the truth of the content but for 9 best information. And there is no other information 10 10 on this available that you can actually get the fact that they took those positions. 11 MR. GARRETT: That is my understanding, 11 transaction prices from. Okay. And, if I understand the Bortz 12 Judge. 12 13 13 MR. STEWART: Thank you. survey correctly, they asked the cable operators how 14 JUDGE von KANN: Okay. Music? 14 they would divide up the budget essentially if they MS. WITSCHEL: Good afternoon, Dr. 15 15 could choose the programming categories a la carte, 16 Crandall. I am Carol Witschel. We did meet before. 16 right? 17 17 THE WITNESS: Yes. Well, I think the intent was to ask them 18 MS. WITSCHEL: Here we go again. 18 how they would divide up their program budget for the 19 19 THE WITNESS: How are you? programming that they currently import, the array of 20 **CROSS-EXAMINATION** 20 distant signal programming they currently import, and 21 BY MS. WITSCHEL: 21 what they would pay for it and how they value that.

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You would agree with me that the Bortz

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That was my discussion, I believe, with --

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I can't remember -- Mr. Hester, yeah, just a few minutes ago, that it is not asking them now, "What would you actually import? And how different would that be from what you currently import?" but, rather, the linchpin is what you currently import.

Q The specific question is, if you had a fixed dollar amount to spend to acquire all of the programming actually broadcast in 1998 on the particular form I am reading, what percentage of the fixed dollar amount would you spend on each type of programming?

A Programming is fixed.

Q Now, the types of programming are fixed.

A Well, I think the intent of that question is that the programming is fixed. Now, it is possible that the -- we may be talking about some slight shift in what kind of syndicated programming and what kind of motion pictures or what kind of sports, but it's -- the intent is to measure the value of that which they currently import, as I understand it.

Q In the same amounts?

A In the same relative amounts, yes.

be able to block certain things fairly easily. It's hard to imagine.

But in the exercise that I understand we are engaged in here and the Bortz survey is certainly engaged in, it is to assume the programming is the current programming, the 1998-1999 programming, is it actually was imported. It would not be changes in that.

Q And just all the same programs in all the same amounts, right?

A Yes, the same relative amounts. Yes.

Q So does the Bortz survey already take time into consideration?

A Take time into consideration.

Q The Fratrik study for trying to allocate the fees paid based on how much time the shows are on. If I am understanding your testimony, the Bortz survey already takes into consideration the relative amount of time each of the programs are on TV?

A Oh, certainly. The cable operator must understand and has in his mind what he is actually importing, how many hour of various programming he

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Q And you say on page 1 of your testimony that the panel should assess the value of the

programming that was actually purchased?

A Yes.

Q And by that, you mean the programming that was actually carried on the distant signals that is compensable in this proceeding, right?

A Yes.

Q And, therefore, it was appropriate for the Bortz survey to tell the cable operators when they were asking the questions to exclude from their estimates the value of any programming that was on the national networks, ABC, NBC, or CBS, right?

A Yes.

Q Now, in an actual market negotiation -- and I think we are on the same page now -- you agree that the cable operator would be purchasing the whole channel? It wouldn't be able to buy these categories a la carte? They would have to either take or leave a whole station?

A Electronics has made a substantial move forward. They might be able to change it. They might

Page 10240

has. But what he is not doing and what the results of the survey clearly show that he is not doing is assigning the same value to each hour that he imports.

Q Now, in an actual market situation, before the cable operator decided to take or leave any particular channel, isn't it true that he would look at Nielsen viewing data?

A He may or may not. I'm not sure that he would. I think he -- as a cable operator, he would look at the type of programming and ask whether that programming would, in fact, be done to his advantage in an ability to charge more or greater number of subscribers.

And that may or may not be co-linear with a Nielsen rating because it may well be that highly rated Nielsen programming is duplicative of what he already has on and would not attract many subscribers. I don't know. He probably has some idea of that, yes.

Q You have a lot of experience with the cable and broadcast industries, right, Dr. Crandall?

A I have experience as a student of them, not in actually operating a cable system.

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Page 10243

Q In your knowledge and experience, isn't it true that the cable operators would see what people are watching in making decisions as to what they want to buy?

Well, but what they are really concerned about is what will add to the value of the cable signal. It may well be that something that attracts my wife to actually turn the television set on at night, which may be a very low-rated programming, would be of greater value to them than simply duplicating, you know, more reruns of I Love Lucy or Cheers, which may be highly rated programs.

And that's what's been at the core of the study of cable television for a long time; that is, that they don't want to just duplicate. They want to expand their audience base.

MS. WITSCHEL: Thank you, Dr. Crandall. I have no further questions.

19 JUDGE von KANN: Any other cross from 20 anyone?

21 (No response.)

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22 JUDGE von KANN: Okay. I think this is to the program category that has the greatest volume vis-a-vis the other categories. Have you considered that?

THE WITNESS: I haven't considered whether it would really create a bias across categories. A lot has to do with the price sensitivity of demand for each category is, and I think I mentioned in my original testimony in testimony in previous proceedings that as long as the price elasticity is relatively the same, then estimates of total value and marginal value will be proportional to one another, so that isn't a problem. But whether in the precise way in which Rosston estimates his linear regression model this is the case. I don't know. I'd have to look at specifically what that witness said and why that would be true.

JUDGE von KANN: One other thing. I guess I had said I would check with you all after lunch to see if you had any consensus on the format of oral argument. I don't know if you'd done anything about over lunch. Well, why don't we pass that and we can poll you in the morning, so you can talk about it at

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the time to break for lunch. And we will come back at 2:05 for redirect.

(Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the foregoing matter was recessed for lunch, to reconvene at 2:05 p.m. the same day.) JUDGE von KANN: Okay. Judge Gulin has a question before we get into redirect.

JUDGE GULIN: One question before we get to redirect. Dr. Crandall, another witness expressed a criticism of the Rosston analysis that you did not address, but since we've got you here maybe I can run it by you. And that was that Rosston, as I appreciate it, seeks to determine the marginal value of an additional minute of programming for each of the program categories, correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes.

JUDGE GULIN: Okay. And the criticism was that marginal value as an economic matter is always greater -- or generally greater than total value.

THE WITNESS: It's the other way around. JUDGE GULIN: Less so than total value. And that, therefore, that creates a bias with respect

1 the end of the day. Okay. Mr. Garrett? 2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 3

BY MR. GARRETT:

Q Dr. Crandall, just to clarify a couple of issues here, one, are you urging that the CARP take account of the seller's perspective for supply side considerations in determining royalty awards in this proceeding?

A No.

Q Are you advocating that the CARP adjust the Bortz results in some way to take account of seller's perspective for supply side considerations?

A No.

Q Now, you're aware that the CRT in the past, in the prior CARP have taken and determined that the seller side and the supply side consideration are relevant in determining royalty awards here.

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Okay. And you're aware that prior CRTs 0 and CARPs have placed somewhat less reliance upon Bortz because it did not take account of the seller's perspective, right?

Page 10245 1 sports leagues h

1 A Yes, I am.

Q And they've always referred to supply side considerations in not giving full weight to the Bortz study, right?

A Yes.

Q Now, assuming that the CARP in this proceeding follows that past precedent, how do seller side considerations impact the awards of -- well, before I get to that, you also described in your earlier testimony here certain concerns you had with what the CRT and the CARP have done on this supply side issue vis-a-vis the Bortz study; do you recall that?

A Yes.

Q Could you just briefly articulate what that position is?

that position is?

A Well, it was that if the Panel or the
Tribunal were to criticize the Bortz study because it
did not fully take into the account the supply side or
the seller's perspective, they had no evidence, no
basis for the adjustments they made. They adjusted
the Sports share down from what the Bortz estimates

sports leagues have advocated policies that would have the result of lowering the copyright royalties paid?

Page 10247

A No, I'm not.

4 Q And when I say copyright royalties, I'm 5 referring to the royalties paid pursuant to Section 6 111. Do you understand that?

A Yes.

Q Are you aware of any instances where the sports leagues have sought policies that would result in lowering of cable rates which in turn would lower the amount of royalties paid, pursuant to Section 111?

A No, I'm not.

Q I direct your attention to one of the documents that Mr. Stewart had asked you to look at, which is Exhibit 55-RX. Do you have that before you?

A I don't have it numbered. Is this the one for Major League Baseball?

Q Yes. This is the petition for clarification or partial reconsideration filed by Baseball.

21 A Okay.

Q Had you seen that document prior to today?

Page 10246

suggested, but as far as I could see in their

decision, there was no reason why they shouldn't have

3 adjusted it upward. There was no basis for adjusting

it down.

Q So if this Panel takes -- follows that past precedent, takes account of the seller's side in evaluating the Bortz result, how should that be -- the Sports award compare to the award for Local Commercial Television?

A Well, in my testimony, I pointed that in the past Commercial Broadcasters had in fact supported policies which would reduce the total copyright royalty pool because they had an incentive to obtain greater carriage of the broadcast signals relative to, say, basic cable networks. That is certainly not the case with the Sports -- Joint Sports Claimants. They have no particular interest in offering their programming at lower rates. If anything, I believe there's a substantial possibility they would insist on substantially higher rates than the current copyright royalty rate schedule.

Are you aware of any instances where the

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A I don't believe so. I'm not going to say I haven't, but I don't believe so, unless it was in this proceeding earlier. Otherwise I would not have seen it, no.

Q Okay. Were you at all familiar with the issue that was -- or with the position that Baseball was taking in that proceeding?

A I was not familiar with the position Baseball was taking. I was familiar with the issue, with the general issue.

Q Okay. And the general issue was what?

A Was whether the FCC had set rates for incremental channels on cable tiers that were compensatory which would provide a sufficient incentive for cable systems to carry new channels.

Q Okay. And when you refer to new channels there was cable programming that was at issue in this -- the carriage of cable programming, right?

19 A Yes. Yes.

Q And, specifically, it was not the carriage of either local or distant broadcast signals, correct?

A That's correct.

Page 10251 Page 10249 1 Q And the position articulated by Baseball 1 new channel. Whereas the broadcasters were attempting 2 2 in this proceeding would in fact have had the effect to lobby for lower basic cable rates during this time 3 of permitting cable operators to increase the rates 3 period in order to get greater carriage for their 4 that they would charge for their services, correct? 4 advertiser-supported programming on cable systems. 5 That's certainly the implication of what 5 Q Okay. Now, let me ask you to turn to 56-6 they're saying on Page 2 of that document, yes. 6 RX. Those are the comments filed by the NBA and the 7 7 All right. With the notion that those NHL; is that right? 8 8 increased rates that Baseball -- or rather sports A Okay. Yes. I have them. 9 9 Q And I'll just direct your attention to leagues would receive additional compensation from 10 Pages 3 to 4. cable operators, right? 10 A I presume that was the motive. 11 A Yes. 11 12 12 Q Right. Is it fair to say that the Have you had a chance to look at that? 13 position -- well, how would you relate the position 13 Now, had you seen this document prior to it being 14 that Baseball was taking in this proceeding that Mr. 14 shown to you this morning? 15 Stewart referenced with positions that broadcasters 15 A I'm rather certain I have never seen this 16 had taken with regard to regulation? 16 document. 17 17 Well, as I mentioned in my testimony and Q Okay. So you were not involved in any way 18 my colloquy with Mr. Stewart, the broadcasters had 18 in the preparation of this document then. 19 supported actually reducing cable rates rather 19 Α 20 substantially. Whereas here we have the Major League 20 Are you familiar with the issues that were Q 21 Baseball suggesting that the rates are not 21 being debated during the proceeding which these 22 22 compensatory and don't provide sufficient incentive comments were filed? Page 10250 Page 10252 for the carriage of additional channels. 1 1 A Well, only vaguely. I think in my 2 2 colloquy to Mr. Stewart I indicated that I had never Now, there's a statement here at the 3 3 bottom of Page 1 to the effect that, "Baseball has a gotten much involved with the definition of what 4 strong interest ensuring that its programming," and 4 constituted a local market back when I was studying 5 you understand that to be the cable programming 5 cable television. 6 referenced here? б Q Okay. All right. In the first section 7 7 A Well, it says its programming. I presume here on the definition of a local commercial station. 8 8 that it means all programming, including cable which do you see that? 9 9 is what is at issue in this document. Α Yes. 10 10 That its programming reaches the largest There's the discussion of the number of viewers possible. Do you see that? 11 circumstances under which a station could be 11 12 Yes. 12 considered local as opposed to distant; do you 13 understand that? 13 How does Baseball's interest in that 14 regard differ, if at all, from interest that a 14 Α Yes. 15 broadcaster might have? 15 And is it your understanding that what the NBA and the NHL were advocating is a policy that would 16 Well, the cable companies -- excuse me, 16 17 the sports leagues want to get the largest number of 17 have ensured -- that would have restricted the number 18 18 viewers but at compensatory, at substantial rates. of instances in which a station might be considered 19 local? Here they are suggesting that the rates being allowed 19

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Yes.

a-vis copyright royalties?

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on cable were not high enough to make it possible,

apparently, for them to put together some package that

would become a new network and obtain carriage on this

And what would the effect of that be vis-

Page 10255 Page 10253 1 A Well, they would mean that in more 1 both royalty payments as well as ensuring carriage 2 2 instances they'd be considered an imported distant within the sports team's home market? 3 signal and therefore subject to copyright payment. 3 A Well, certainly, by them taking control of 4 Q Is it fair to say that the vision they 4 what is a local and what is a distant signal allows 5 5 were articulating here was one that was designed to sports leagues to attempt to in fact have higher rates 6 increase the amount of royalties to be paid pursuant 6 for importing distant signals and distant market 7 7 to Section 11? teams' signals into the market, and in fact they have 8 8 A Yes. It seems to me that's what they're every incentive to keep those rates rather high in order to make sure that we don't have a country in 9 saying in the middle of Page 4. 9 10 10 All right. And that's in contrast to the which everybody's watching just the Atlanta Braves and 11 position that the broadcasters have taken on similar 11 New York Yankees and there's not a competitive league 12 kinds of issues. 12 as a result. 13 13 A Well, in contrast to positions that the Q Okay. Let me ask you -- I'm going to mark 14 broadcasters have taken which were lower in copyright 14 as Rebuttal Exhibit 6-R, John? 15 15 royalties. This would actually lead to maintenance (Whereupon, the above-referred 16 16 and no decline in copyright royalties. to document was marked as 17 17 JSC Exhibit No. 6-R for Q Okay. Now, the second issue that's 18 18 addressed in this document is request or add identification.) 19 communities to or delete communities from a television 19 Q Six-R is the written testimony of Edward 20 market; do you see that? 20 O. Fritts, President and CEO, National Association of 21 Α Yes. 21 Broadcasters, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 22 22 0 Do you have some general familiarity with April 6, 1992. This was three years after the Page 10254 Page 10256 1 1 the issue that was being discussed here? testimony that Mr. Stewart had referred to earlier. 2 Well, I understand generally the issue. 2 First of all, Dr. Crandall, you're 3 3 I don't know the specifics of what they were familiar with Mr. Fritts? 4 suggesting, other than what I've read in this 4 I remember his vaguely. That's 11 years A 5 document. 5 ago. 6 Okay. What would be the effect of 6 O Is he still with us? 7 7 deleting a community from a station's ADI market vis-I don't know. I'm not as much involved in 8 8 these issues today, Mr. Garrett. a-vis the Copyright Royalty Fund? 9 9 A Well, if it was shifted from one market to Q All right. You're aware, though, that he was the President and CEO of the National Association 10 another, then the carriage by that -- by a cable 10 system in the market to which it was added as a local 11 of Broadcasters here back in the early '90s? 11 12 signal would not be compensable under the compulsory 12 A Unless he mischaracterized his position in 13 copyright license system. 13 this document, yes. 14 Q All right. So if a broadcaster, for 14 Q Okay. Are you aware that the conventional 15 example, sought to have a particular market declared 15 broadcasters have opposed elimination of the within the ADI, that would reduce the potential 16 16 compulsory license? 17 17 royalties paid to that signal? A That's my understanding from just a quick 18 A If it were considered a local signal for 18 reading of the newspapers, yes. 19 19 distant signal purposes, yes. Q How does that fact relate to the seller's 20 All right. Do you understand that by 20 perspective here? 21 giving sports leagues some control over what is in or 21 A Well, if in fact the broadcasters want to

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outside a local ADI, that that also has an impact on

continue this system but other claimants, such as the

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- 1 Sports Claimants or perhaps the motion picture
- 2 companies do not, would suggest to me as an economist
- 3 that the latter think that they can obtain much higher
- 4 rates or better compensation in the absence of the
- 5 compulsory copyright system despite the transactions
 - cost and would prefer that system. Whereas,
- 7 apparently the NAB does not think that that would be
- 8 the case for them.

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- Q Let me just ask you to turn to Page 21 of Mr. Fritts' statement, which is Page 191 of the -- up at the top of this document; do you see that?
 - A Yes.

JUDGE von KANN: In regard to your last answer, does the fact that one who might oppose the elimination of a system other groups favor suggest that they've made different calculations about whether they can improve their royalty revenues by getting out from under a compulsory license or rather improve their profits generally? It strikes me that one might say, "Well, I don't know, royalty payments will stay about the same but we'll be able to sell more

1 look for other ways to distribute their product at

2 higher rates. They wouldn't offer the same deal or

they get the same carriage and they wouldn't be ableto shift.

5 JUDGE von KANN: Okay.

BY MR. GARRETT:

Q Just ask you to turn to Page -- well, the page I asked you to turn to earlier.

A Twenty-one is what you asked me to turn to.

11 Q Thank you. Down at the bottom of that 12 page --

JUDGE von KANN: Bottom of which page, Mr. Garrett?

MR. GARRETT: It was Page 21 on Mr. Fritts' statement and 191 of the transcript. See, it says, "Elimination of the compulsory license would, however, result in significant dislocations in the current marketplace," do you see that?

THE WITNESS: Where are you pointing to now, I'm sorry?

BY MR. GARRETT:

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1 So, on balance, we'll come out better if we don't have

advertising or we'll be able to do this or do that.

a compulsory license system." I wouldn't have thought

that the calculus would be based solely on this piece

of their profit structure which is after all a

relatively small part of their profit structure.

THE WITNESS: Well, I think that's correct. I think that probably what they would do is raise their demands for compensation for similar sorts of carriage, and indeed it might lead to lower carriage through this medium and a shift to other more lucrative ways of distributing the product. But this suggests they want a higher price than a lower price.

JUDGE von KANN: Or that somehow or other they've concluded that getting out from under this will ultimately increase their overall profit in some fashion, perhaps some alternative revenue sources or I don't know what.

THE WITNESS: Yes, but I think -- but it would -- it seems to me logic would compel you to think that they believe they would then raise the price for the current form of distribution, perhaps making it unattractive for someone to carry it and

Page 10260

Q Down at the very -- the final -- you're on Page 21?

A Page 21, yes. "The compulsory license deserves reexamination."

Q Right.

A Right.

Q All the way down at the bottom there.

A Yes. Oh, I see, yes. Okay. Okay.

9 Q "Will result in significant dislocations 10 in the current marketplace;" do you see that?

A Right.

Q And the NAB goes on over the next couple of pages to talk about those dislocations and the limited respects in which the compulsory license ought to be reexamined; do you see that?

A Yes.

Q For example, on the very next page, 22, there's a discussion there about restricting -- I'm sorry, broadening the definition of local market, do you see that, the paragraph beginning, "Further?"

A Yes. Yes, I do.

Q "An action that would have, and in fact

Page 10263 Page 10261 and export it to markets in which there are other 1 has, resulted in reduction of copyright royalties," 1 2 2 correct? teams thereby reducing the value of the sports rights 3 A Yes, it would. 3 in those markets. And what the leagues would like to 4 Q All right. Now, just turn over to Page 24 4 do is to gain control over their entire broadcasting and look at that first paragraph up at the top. Do 5 package to limit these overlaps and limit the 5 6 6 you see they talk about another dilemma that repeal of reduction in value that this causes. 7 7 the compulsory license would have on sports Now, how do those considerations for programming; do you see that? 8 8 sports leagues differ, if at all, from considerations 9 Certainly. Yes. 9 that like a broadcaster would have in seeking distant 10 10 And then there's a statement, "National carriage? 0 and regional superstations which have grown up under 11 A Well, it suggests that the sports leagues 11 12 12 would clearly want higher prices, would get greater the compulsory license often find their strongest 13 13 appeal to viewers generated by their carriage of rates and would insist on much greater rates for that 14 sporting events." Do you see that? 14 type of carriage to the extent that apparently the 15 Yes. 15 President of the National Association of Broadcasters Α 16 O And it talks about the effect of 16 believes that there would be substantially less eliminating the compulsory license might be to reduce 17 17 carriage on superstations because the price would be 18 18 or eliminate the number of sports telecasts; do you too high. 19 see that? 19 MR. GARRETT: Okay. I move 6-R under the 20 Α Yes. Yes. 20 conditions that we're applying to all of this. 21 The statement there that Mr. Fritts makes, 21 JUDGE von KANN: As evidence that these 22 22 "Given the firm position of the sports leagues that statements were made to Congress. Page 10262 Page 10264 1 1 national and regional distribution of televised games MR. GARRETT: These statements were made 2 2 under the compulsory license reduces their ability to to Congress. 3 3 obtain full value for the television rights to many MR. STEWART: No objection. 4 4 JUDGE von KANN: So received. local events, it is reasonable to expect that the end 5 of the compulsory license would be the effective end 5 (Whereupon, the above-referred б to superstations or at least of professional sports in 6 to document, previously marked 7 7 distant signals." Do you see that? as JSC 6-R for identification, 8 8 was received into evidence.) Yes. 9 Q Fair to say that one of the arguments that 9 MR. GARRETT: I'd like to have another 10 the broadcasters have given for the continuation of 10 exhibit to be marked as 7-R. 11 the compulsory license is the importance of getting 11 (Whereupon, the above-referred 12 continued sports on those distant signals? 12 to document was marked as 13 13 JSC Exhibit No. 7-R for I'm sorry, ask the question again. 14 Well, let me ask you this, that statement, 14 identification.) 15 "Given the firm position of sports leagues here," do 15 MR. GARRETT: These are reply comments of 16 16 the Association of Local Television Stations in you see that? 17 17 Α Yes. Copyright Office Docket RM97-1 dealing with the 18 O How does that relate to the seller's 18 revision of the cable and satellite compulsory 19 19 perspective issues here? licenses. 20 20 Well, what this suggests is that these Now, Dr. Crandall, are you familiar with 21 compulsory copyright rates that superstations have the 21 the thought that in 1997 the Copyright Office, at the 22 ability to obtain this value of the sports programming 22 request of Congress, undertook an inquiry into the

Page 10265 Page 10267 1 cable and satellite compulsory licenses? 1 BY MR. GARRETT: 2 2 THE WITNESS: Only vaguely, but I'm aware "Under Section 325(b) of the 3 3 Communications Act," do you see that? of it, yes. 4 BY MR. GARRETT: 4 Α Yes. 5 Q All right. And are you aware that one of 5 Go down a couple of more lines. It says, 6 the issues that was discussed in that proceeding was 6 "In acquiring rights, a station must compete in a 7 7 whether or not the cable and satellite compulsory highly competitive market. However, when it turns to 8 licenses should continue? 8 resell those rights, it is facing a single monopoly 9 9 buyer in the local cable system;" do you see that? A I believe that's correct, but as I say, 10 10 I'm only vaguely aware of the whole proceeding. Α Yes. Q All right. You're aware that the motion 11 0 And you discussed with Mr. Stewart here 11 12 12 picture interest and the music interest and the sports about having to deal with a cable system that is a 13 interest all strongly advocated the elimination of the 13 monopolist; do you recall that? 14 cable compulsory license? 14 Yes. Monopsonist, I guess, would be the 15 15 That's my understanding, yes. better term, yes. 16 And that the commercial and non-commercial 16 Q In the next line there they say, "Stations Q broadcasters took an opposing view on that. 17 easily might end up gaining little compensation for 17 18 18 I believe that's correct. rights obtained at a considerable cost and would be 19 Q All right. And the Association of Local 19 caught in the middle, forced to buy high and sell low 20 Television Stations is a trade association that 20 to assure the continued availability of its entire 21 represents individual television stations who are not 21 broadcast schedule." How does that view specified by 22 22 affiliated with the ABC, NBC and CBS network the broadcasters then relate to this issue of seller's Page 10266 Page 10268 1 1 affiliates. Are you familiar with them? perspective or supply side? 2 Α Yes. 2 Well, it suggests that this group of 3 3 We have here the reply comments where they stations in particular believes that as a result of an 4 respond in part to arguments that were raised by the 4 5 sports interests, and the first being on Pages 1 and 5 '97, under the '92 Act, namely the retransmission 6 going to Page 4 and then to the MPAA being on Page 4; 6 consent exercise, that they had been singularly 7 7

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do you see that?

A Yes.

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Let me just ask you to turn to Page 5 and Footnote 11 in particular.

Α Yes.

0 And the Chair of the ALTV raises questions about -- I mean in order to support their argument that the compulsory license should continue, they discuss what would happen in a marketplace absent compulsory licenses; do you see that?

Α Yes.

Q And you see there in the third line their statement, "Consequently, local stations rarely have secured monetary consideration from cable systems for granting retransmission consent under Section --PARTICIPANT: Slow down.

experiment that had been connected up to that time, unsuccessful in obtaining remuneration for their signals and that they would be forced to continue to sell them at virtually zero price even though they had paid substantial amounts for the copyrighted material in their programming.

And this was to ensure -- they would do so in order to ensure the continued carriage of those signals?

Well, in order to ensure that they have a A broadcast lineup that people will watch in the noncable market as well. I mean they have to offer a product that people will watch.

MR. GARRETT: I move 7-R. JUDGE von KANN: Mr. Stewart? MR. STEWART: I have no objection. JUDGE von KANN: All right. Received

	Page 10269		Page 10271
1 .	again, I guess, as evidence that these statements were	1	Q Dr. Crandall, just to clarify something,
2	made.	2	if you'd look at 56-RX, the NBA exhibit.
3	(Whereupon, the above-referred	3	A The NAB exhibit, okay. Yes.
4	to document, previously marked	4	Q And look at Page 4.
5	as JSC 7-R for identification,	5	A The one that's also 174?
6	was received into evidence.)	6	Q No.
7	BY MR. GARRETT:	7	A Are we in the same document?
8	Q Let me you had a discussion with Mr.	8	Q No, we're not.
9	Hester about Dr. Rosston's regression analysis and how	9	A Oh, I'm sorry.
10	Dr. Rosston treated 3.75; do you recall that?	10	Q These are the NHL comments.
11	A Yes.	11	A This one? Oh, the NHL. Oh, I thought you
12	Q And you had laid out in your testimony an	12	said NAB. Okay. I'm sorry. Okay. NBA.
13	example of how the Rosston regression analysis works	13	Q Page 4. Page numbered 4 of the
14	in the case of carriage of a PTV signal and a 3.75	14	A Right. Right. Okay. I'm sorry.
15	signal; do you recall that?	15	Q Looking at the middle paragraph there,
16	A Yes.	16	doesn't it say exactly the opposite of what you and
17	Q And you were asked some questions about	17	Mr. Garrett agreed that it said?
18	the impact that whether the concern that you	18	JUDGE von KANN: What page are you on?
19	expressed there would apply to other kinds of	19	MR. STEWART: Page 4.
20	claimants in this proceeding, not just PTV, correct?	20	THE WITNESS: Let me read this one more
21	A Yes.	21	time again.
22	Q Is PTV different in some way than the	22	(Pause.)
	Page 10270		Page 10272
1	other claimants here with respect to that concern that	1	THE WITNESS: Well, remind me. What do
2	you raised?	2	you think it says. I don't know what the question is.
3	A Well, they're the only ones among the	3	BY MR. STEWART:
4	major claimants who cannot do not qualify for the	4	Q It appears that somehow an interpretation
5	3.75, so they're different in that respect, from	5	was proposed of the statute that said under which if
6	Program Suppliers or Sports or Commercial	6	a television station agreed to reimburse the copyright
7	Broadcasters.	7	royalties of a cable operator no matter where the
8	Q How does that relate to the particular	8	cable operator was, it would then somehow be
9	concern that you express here in your testimony?	9	considered a local signal and therefore eligible for
10	A Well, it means that they could not be	10	must-carry rights on the cable system. Isn't that
11	penalized for being a 3.75 signal and being mixed up	11	what this paragraph is addressing, that argument?
12	with another one that's not a 3.75 signal. So the	12	A Yes. Yes.
13	downward bias on them caused by the upward bias on the	13	Q And I can't say I disagree with it but the
14	non-3.75 signal could not occur because they're not	14	leagues here are saying you should not allow that
15	they could never be included as a 3.75 signal.	15	interpretation to prevail because that would allow
16 17	Q Okay. I have no further questions. Thank	16	stations, and WTBS is the particular example, to go
17	you, Dr. Crandall.	17	out and require carriage of each and every cable
18 19	JUDGE von KANN: Mr. Stewart?	18	operator in the country simply by offering to
20	MR. STEWART: Yes. I have a few	19	reimburse the copyright royalties, correct?
21	questions. RECROSS EXAMINATION	20 21	A Right. And they would lose control. They would then lose control of their it would lead to
	NECKOSS EAAMINATION		would men lose common of them It would lead to
21	BY MR. STEWART:	22	downward pressure on their copyright royalties.

Page 10273 Page 10275 1 Q And that interpretation that's being 1 Immaculate Conception or something. 2 opposed here, no matter what the wisdom of it is, 2 MR. STEWART: Yes. They're Old Testament 3 would have had the effect of increasing the Copyright 3 and we're New Testament. 4 Royalty Fund, correct? 4 (Laughter.) 5 A The issue here it can be considered a 5 JUDGE von KANN: Let's go ahead and leave 6 local must-carry station. 6 that disputation for a later date. 7 7 Q Right. BY MR. STEWART: 8 So if it is indeed -- it remains as an 8 Q I must say that it's difficult for me to 9 respond to these documents that have been put in as 9 imported distant signal and therefore continues -that's right, it continues to be considered in the 10 10 Exhibits 6-R and 7-R, but let me just ask a couple of 11 questions about them. If you look at 7-R. pool. 11 12 12 What the league is saying here -- what the A Let me get them out here so I know what 13 league is imposing is an argument whereby WTBS could 13 we're talking about. Is it this one? Okay. All 14 go out and force itself as a distant signal on 14 right. 15 15 additional cable operators, therefore, increasing the Do you know, Dr. Crandall, what the Fund, and the NBA and NHL are opposing that 16 16 Association of Local Television Stations, Inc. is? 17 interpretation; isn't that right? 17 It's an association of local television 18 MR. GARRETT: Let me object to the 18 broadcasters. I don't recall what their membership is 19 question. I think that Mr. Stewart is wrong here, but 19 made up of. Mr. Garrett said that they were non-ABC, 20 regardless of that fact the document's going to speak 20 CBS and NBC affiliates. 21 for itself. The Witness was not familiar with it. 21 They're actually less than that. They are 22 22 Mr. Stewart has asked his questions about it, I've -- they do not represent the commercial broadcast Page 10274 Page 10276 industry, do they? 1 asked my questions about it, and I would just simply 1 2 say we could argue what it means, but I think I know 2 Well, not the entire commercial broadcast 3 3 what the sports leagues were saying. industry. 4 JUDGE von KANN: Well, you may but since 4 Q And, let's see, on Page 5, he pointed you 5 you can't testify --5 to a footnote that said in the second sentence, "Local 6 MR. GARRETT: Well, sure I can. 6 stations rarely have secured monetary consideration 7 7 (Laughter.) from cable systems for granting retransmission 8 8 consent;" do you see that? MR. GARRETT: That's what going to happen 9 if he keeps asking these questions. I will be 9 What page are we on now, I'm sorry? Page 5. 10 testifying. Dr. Crandall, obviously, is of no further 10 0 11 assistance on this matter. 11 A Yes. Yes. Okay. Yes. 12 JUDGE von KANN: Well, do you wish to 12 And you see the sentence immediately after 13 13 the one he asked you to read? Would you read that, pursue it, Mr. Stewart? 14 MR. STEWART: No. I think it actually 14 the "No basis exists"? 15 speaks for itself, and I was simply following up on 15 "No basis exists for presuming that 16 the testimony that Mr. Garrett elicited from Dr. 16 program producers would fair any better." 17 17 Crandall. Do you know whether program producers already had the right under the retransmission consent 18 JUDGE von KANN: Let's say that when this 18 19 19 regime to seek to obtain compensation for the granting subject periodically erupts in this hearing I keep 20 having this vision of Martin Luther and the Pope 20 of retransmission consent rights? 21 quoting various passages of the Bible to try to debate 21 Independently of the station itself? 2.2 22 a particularly difficult part of the Doctrine of By acquiring that right from the station,

Page 10279

1 by negotiating it.

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- A Oh, they can negotiate that, that's right.
 - Q And, I guess, finally, looking at --
- A And you're asking about that no basis
 exists for presuming that program producers would fair
 any better.
 - Q Yes.
 - A I mean I don't know what that means and it's not an assertion from the program producers, it's an assertion from someone from the local television stations. The program producers, as I understand it, are in favor of eliminating compulsory copyright. Is he saying that they don't know their own self interest?
 - Q Are you saying that broadcasters don't know their own self-interest? I think that's fairly -- that's what you have been saying, Dr. Crandall.

Going to finally to 6-R and just the issue of the continuing existence of the compulsory license. First of all, it appears that in this testimony from 11 years ago Mr. Fritts did support some modification reform of the compulsory license, right?

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A I don't know. I only know that document to the extent that Mr. Garrett was pointing me to various sentences.

Q Okay. And Mr. Garrett pointed you to sentences that talked about elimination of the compulsory license resulting in significant dislocations in the current marketplace; do you recall that?

- A Yes, I remember.
- Q Now, are you aware, Dr. Crandall, that the compulsory license is what permits cable operators to retransmit to local stations within their own market?
- A Well, there are -- yes, there is a -- there's always been for some time a retransmission consent for local stations.
- Q Not retransmission consent.
- 17 A I'm sorry, I mean compulsory license. I 18 misspoke.
- 19 Q Section 111 --
- 20 A Right.
- Q -- permits cable operators to retransmit local television -- retransmit television stations,

- either local or distant, right?
 - A Yes.

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- Q And then a part of 111 says and when it's distant you pay money for it, and the money gets distributed among the copyright owners, correct?
 - A Yes.
- Q If you didn't have a compulsory license, you would have a situation in which all local television stations could be turned off of all of the local cable systems in their market through the operation of the music licensing societies or one of the sports representatives who would simply refuse to permit the retransmission of that program on the local cable system?

A It would be the same as any other program supplier; that is, they'd have to negotiate for that privilege. They couldn't get it for nothing. They might have to pay the cable system for carriage the way some other entities do or they might get paid for carriage depending upon the value of their programming.

Q From the perspective of a broadcaster

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- licensed to serve the Washington market, let's just
- say, the prospect of being unavailable -- being made
 unavailable in all of the cable households in its
- unavariable in an of the cable households in its
- 4 local Washington market because of the position of one
- of the program suppliers on its station would be a fairly substantial dislocation for the local broadcas
 - fairly substantial dislocation for the local broadcast industry, would it not?
- A Yes, it would. And it suggests that maybe
 the point that I made in my testimony and I'm going to
 reiterate here is valid, which is that you might have
 to offer it at a very low price and maybe even a
 negative price. And the seller's perspective would be
 that you offer it at a very low price.
- 14 Q In a local market.
- 15 A Yes.
- Q And in fact it's free at this point.
- 17 A Yes
- 18 Q There is no compulsory license fee for
- 19 local retransmission, correct?
- A Right. That's my understanding, yes.
- Q Can you understand would it be reasonable from your perspective for the broadcast industry to

Page 10283 Page 10281 1 have a position or to have had a position back in 1992 1 O Could you explain why? 2 2 that the elimination of the compulsory license, given Because I think that it's very difficult 3 the effect it would have on local market carriage of 3 to do so, and I have a little bit of information I 4 all of the local broadcast stations, would be a 4 thought would help the Panel on how the seller's 5 5 substantial dislocation of the broadcast industry? perspective would take place, but it's very difficulty 6 I don't know if it would be reasonable but 6 to figure out how all of these forces would work out. 7 7 I'm not -- I don't know -- this was talking about the We've been discussing various positions that lobbying 8 8 elimination of compulsory license for local as well as interests have taken on eliminating the compulsory 9 9 imported distant signal or just imported distant copyright because they wanted higher rates or a 10 10 signals. different system of distribution. In fact, my 11 11 position is that the Bortz survey serves -- unadjusted Q Right. If the question were only whether 12 12 serves as the best possible indicator of relative there should be a compulsory license for distant 13 signals, do you have information about the broadcast 13 value in this proceeding. 14 stations' position with respect to that? 14 And without trying to take any look at the 15 15 No. I do not. seller's side. 16 16 And in this proceeding, the broadcast A I think that would be the best approach, 0 17 17 industry is here seeking a substantial increase in the but if there is such an adjustment, I think I've indicated how I think. At least there's some evidence 18 royalties that are paid for distant signal 18 19 19 that suggests how it should go. retransmissions of its programs; you understand that. 20 I'm sorry, give me that again. 20 Okay. Thank you. 21 What we're here for right now, today, is 21 Α Sure. 22 22 to get the money which isn't available in the free JUDGE von KANN: Any other recross or Page 10282 Page 10284 marketplace under the compulsory license to compensate 1 redirect? 1 2 broadcast stations for those programs that they own. 2 MR. GARRETT: As the representative of the 3 3 But to oppose the elimination of this Pope, I think I will pass. 4 institution for fear that the rates you'd have to sell 4 JUDGE von KANN: Okay. The Pope passes. 5 your programming would be lower and you'd actually 5 We need to speak for one moment before Dr. Crandall 6 obtain less, and that's the point of the seller's 6 leaves. Let us talk for a second. 7 7 perspective. (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off 8 8 the record at 2:55 p.m. and went back on Q In the local market? Well, in this particular proceeding, we're 9 9 the record at 3:10 p.m.) only talking about imported distant signals. 10 JUDGE von KANN: Before Dr. Crandall 10 Correct. Only exported distant signals 11 11 leaves, we did want to raise one matter. Yesterday, 12 from the broadcasters --12 in the course of his testimony, Dr. Fairley indicated 13 13 A Right. Right. that there were certain adjustments that he believed Thank you. No further questions. 14 14 were appropriate with respect to the Bortz numbers in

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JUDGE von KANN: Mr. Hester?

Q Dr. Crandall, Mr. Garrett started his

edamination of you by asking whether you were urging

MR. HESTER: A quick one.

that the CARP take account of the seller's

perspective, and I believe you said no.

That's correct.

BY MR. HESTER:

order to adjust for certain biases that he perceived

in the Bortz survey. And he calculated those in the

calculations for the separate incremental effects of

tomorrow, if they wish, to have Dr. Fairley recalled

composite form or the aggregated form but not

presented separate calculations, and the Panel

afforded PTV an opportunity to present those

each adjustment with the right of the parties

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for cross examination about that.

Today, Dr. Crandall was cross examined some about a perception on his part that the Rosston analysis contains a bias in favor of PTV with respect to the 3.75 matter. He has not presented to us to date any specific calculation of the impact of that bias or how one would adjust for it. We, therefore, wanted to ask you, Mr. Garrett, sort of in fairness and in parallel, whether you would like the opportunity to let Dr. Crandall present, perhaps tomorrow, a calculation of that impact of that particular bias if that can be done readily -- I frankly don't know how complicated it is to do -- with a similar opportunity that it would be given to other parties and they would have a chance to cross examine him about it. I don't obviously know what Dr. Crandall's schedule is. He does live here as opposed to California. And it's up to you, I think, really. It was not something that was included in the rebuttal, and I don't know how quickly it can be done, and I don't know what desire you do or don't have to present that.

what's involved here in terms of time, expense and whether the end product is something that will be in fact useful, just having discussed this, the broader issue, generally, before. But given your specific request, let me talk to Dr. Crandall and see where we go.

JUDGE von KANN: All right. Mr. Stewart? MR. STEWART: I understand that you have discussed this and made this request, but I have a strong objection. One of your orders said that to the extent a party criticizes the quantitative evidence of another party because of a defect, they are required to provide the quantitative impact of that defect, and I'm prepared to argue this in proposed findings, if there is a bias of the kind that Dr. Crandall suggested but it was incumbent on him in his rebuttal testimony, pursuant to your order, to provide that impact. Dr. Fairley, on the other hand, did precisely that. He did it in a way that was consolidated, and it seems to me that what arose during the course of his testimony was an interest of the Panel in knowing the impact, the quantitative impact of less than all

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And I guess the first question is whether you have a desire to do that, and then if you do, we'd have to consider what time frame is reasonable and appropriate. Maybe you're not interested or maybe you're interested but it can't be done by tomorrow or whatever. Then we'll have to figure that out. So we thought that since to some extent we afforded that opportunity to the PTV we should afford you a similar opportunity if you wished to do it.

MR. GARRETT: Well, I guess the answer is I don't know without talking to Dr. Crandall. I would still maintain my objection to Dr. Fairley to do what he's doing, but I understand what you're asking or offering here. But I would need to talk to --

JUDGE von KANN: Would you like for us to give you a short break to do that, have that conversation?

MR. GARRETT: I think that would probably be appropriate.

JUDGE YOUNG: And we may be able to work out something on the timing if that's the intent.

MR. GARRETT: Yes. I just don't know

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of the changes that he proposed. I think this is a different situation, and I would just make my position known for the record.

JUDGE von KANN: Well, I think it is a somewhat different situation, and, frankly, the point you raise is an interesting one. Why don't we find out if it's a moot point or not, because if Mr.

Garrett elects not to avail himself of the opportunity, we'll not have to decide it. But if he wishes to, then I guess we'll have to think a little bit about what you've just said. So let's take just a few minutes and let you speak to Dr. Crandall, and you may come back and say, "Thank you very much but we're not interested." Then it becomes a non-issue.

Okay? Ten minutes or something like that? Is that --MR. GARRETT: Ten minutes should be fine.

MR. GARRETT: Ten minutes should be fine. (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record at 3:17 p.m. and went back on the record at 3:37 p.m.)

JUDGE VON KANN: Okay. Mr. Trautman, welcome back. Have a seat and be sworn.

WHEREUPON.

Page 10291 Page 10289 1 JAMES TRAUTMAN 1 Q And I take it you would agree with me that 2 2 was called as a witness and, having been first duly in the very next sentence after the sentence you're 3 sworn, assumed the witness stand, was examined and 3 referring to in that CRT decision, the CRT also 4 testified as follows: 4 concluded that an adjustment was nonetheless required 5 JUDGE VON KANN: And I think earlier we 5 to the Bortz survey in that year. 6 6 had a request from Program Suppliers for about 30 A I'm not aware what the -- of the specific 7 7 minutes or so, and Mr. Hester about the same, and Mr. sequence in which it occurred. I'm aware that there 8 Satterfield perhaps 15. And I don't remember if we 8 was a conclusion regarding an adjustment. 9 talked about the order. Any preference? 9 Mr. Trautman, can you find the 1989 10 10 MR. TUCCI: I can make this somewhat decision in there? I'm not sure I know which tab easier, because I'm revising my 30 minutes down to 11 11 number it is. 12 12 JUDGE VON KANN: 14. 13 13 JUDGE VON KANN: Oh. MR. HESTER: 14. 14 MR. TUCCI: For now. 14 JUDGE VON KANN: 14 it should be. And 15 JUDGE VON KANN: Okay. Well, that's fine. 15 what page, please? 16 Mr. Hester, do you want to go next? 16 MR. HESTER: This is at the very bottom of MR. HESTER: All right. 17 15299 and over to the top of 15300. 17 18 18 JUDGE VON KANN: Okay. Go first. BY MR. HESTER: 19 MR. HESTER: I may also have less than a 19 Q Do you have that? I'm in the far right-20 half an hour. 20 hand column at the bottom of 15299. 21 JUDGE VON KANN: Okay. 21 Α Yes. 22 22 CROSS EXAMINATION 0 There's a sentence at the bottom of Page 10290 Page 10292 1 page 15299 where the Panel -- I'm sorry, the CRT in 1 BY MR. HESTER: Q Good to see you again, Mr. Trautman. I'm 2 that proceeding said, "The Tribunal appreciates that 2 3 3 Tim Hester, representing the Public Television the survey was designed to refer the Respondent to 4 Claimants. 4 actual carriage during 1989, and asking them to assess 5 Α Hello. 5 how much they might have spent on PBS would have 6 Q I wanted to ask you, if you could, to turn 6 caused confusion." Do you see that? 7 7 to page 1 of your testimony. I see that, yes. 8 A Yes. 8 And that's what you're referring to in 9 At the very bottom of the page, this is 9 your testimony at the bottom of page 1? where you are discussing the issue of the fact that 10 Α Yes. 10 only those that carried public television signals were 11 And then, in the next sentence, the CRT 11 12 actually asked to put a value on it in the survey, 12 said, "Therefore, the design of the survey is not correct? 13 faulted, but an adjustment nonetheless needed to be 13 14 14 made." Do you see that? A Yes, it is. 15 And you say, at the very bottom of the 15 Α I see that sentence, yes. page, discussing the 1989 CRT decision, you say that 16 And the adjustment that the CRT adopted in 16 17 the CRT agreed with this approach in its 1989 17 that proceeding was on the basis of its conclusion 18 decision, concluding that asking questions about the 18 that the survey results underrepresented PBS? 19 19 value of distant signal programming in instances where Yes. I don't agree with their conclusion, 20 it was not carried would cause confusion. Do you see 20 but I -- I do see the indication that an adjustment 21 that? 21 was made. 22 22 Α I see that, yes. Q Right. Now, I wanted to ask you to go to

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on Monday, February 12, 2018 I provided a true and correct copy of the Robert Crandall Rebuttal Oral Testimony (JSC Written Direct Statement Vol. III) to the following:

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Signed: /s/ Michael E Kientzle